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The purpose of our study is to explore an assumed negative relationship between 
economic informality and welfare state expenditure in the case of Kosovo. We do that 
by comparing Kosovo‟s indicators of informal economy and welfare state policies with 
those of 28 other European countries. We then zoom in on Kosovo‟s case by using 
relevant studies, reports and material gathered in eight semi-structured interviews with 
representative of institutions whose work is related to the subjects of study.  
We discuss informal economy in relation with welfare state policies, institutional 
asymmetry and social capital in post-socialist societies. We provide statistical evidence 
that countries with larger informal economy are more likely to have poorer welfare state 
programs, lower social capital and higher institutional asymmetry. Results show that 
Kosovo fits the theoretical model.  
Nevertheless, although data do suggest that such a relationship exists, we could not 
provide evidence disentangling causal directions or their relative intensities.  
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O objetivo deste estudo é explorar a relação presumidamente negativa entre economia 
informal e gastos com programas política social in Kosovo. Fizemos isto através da 
comparação dos indicadores de economia informal e políticas sociais em Kosovo e em 
outros 28 países europeus. Em seguida, analisamos o caso de Kosovo utilizando estudos 
relevantes, relatórios e os dados recolhidos em oito entrevistas semiestruturadas a 
representantes de instituições cujo trabalho está relacionado ao tema em estudo.  
Discutimos a relação entre economia informal e políticas sociais, assimetria 
institucional e capital social nas sociedades pós-socialistas. Por fim, apresentamos 
dados estatísticos indicando que países com maiores índices de informalidade 
económica tendem a possuir programas sociais mais limitados, menor capital social e 
maior assimetria institucional. Os resultados obtidos apontam que o caso de Kosovo 
corresponde a este modelo explicativo. 
Contudo, embora os dados sugiram a existência daquela relação, não nos foi possível 
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This study entails a discussion of two separate subjects, namely those of the 
informal economy and welfare state programs, in search of relationships between the 
two. We express a particular interest towards their interaction within post-socialist 
societies, particularly the Republic of Kosovo. 
The purpose of our study is to explore an assumed negative relationship between 
economic informality and welfare state expenditure in the case of Kosovo, by 
comparing Kosovo‟s indicators of informal economy and welfare state policies with 
those of 28 other European countries, an then zooming in on Kosovo‟s case by using 
relevant studies, reports and material gather during out semi-structured interviews with 
representative of institutions whose work is related to the subjects of study.  
The study starts off by discussing the informal economy, its definition, common 
practices, the reasons and motivations behind the spread of informality with special 
focus on institutional quality, institutional asymmetry and social capital, its dubious 
impact in the economy and ways of tackling it. A discussion follows on welfare state 
policies, regime types, and transformations experienced in that respect in the post-
socialist societies.  We then look at the impact of the welfare state programs on social-
economic development at large, and in relation to economic informality, based on 
available studies. Conclusively, we provide our statistical evidence that countries with 
larger informal economy are more likely to have poorer welfare state programs, lower 
social capital and higher institutional asymmetry. Results show that Kosovo fits the 
theoretical model.  
1. Background of the problem 
 The notion of informal economy is widely used and it encompasses many 
different economic activities that could be bound to both legal and illegal nature. 
However, for the purpose of our study, we will define informal economy or undeclared 
economy, as it is often referred, as all activities that while not criminal in their 
substantive outcome, are hidden from the state or ignore state legal regulations; e.g., 
informal employment, informal payment, under-declaration of salaries, tax evasion etc. 
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Our definition excludes marginal-non-taxed activities, and assumes money as the 
medium of exchange.  
The size and the character of the informal economy are vulnerable to many 
factors. Researchers have identified that informality is subject to low-economic 
development, inappropriate tax system and restrictive labor regulations (de Soto 1989; 
Lehmann 2012; OECD 2004; Riinvest 2013), fragile administration, poor monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms, bureaucratic incompetence, lack of trust towards 
institutions (Gerxhani 1999), miscarriage of taxpaying services and poor pubic services 
(Schneider 2007). Suggestively, informal economies are commonly widespread in 
developing countries, in which they serve as a survival mechanism as the existing 
regular economy fails to accommodate and provide for everyone.  
Although we come across arguments that informal economy has a positive 
impact in the economy, especially in the developing countries, due to the ability to 
absorbs a considerable part of population who are left outside the formal sector (Portes 
and Haller 2005; Riinvest 2013), most schools of thought seem to agree that it must be 
eradicated because it hinders economic growth, offers poor working terms and 
conditions, and deprives citizens of state benefits (Gerxhani 1999; Hudosn, Williams, 
Orviska, and Nadin 2012). Therefore, for as longs as appropriate measures or/and 
incentives are not introduced to decrease informal economy, its self-preserving 
mechanisms will ensure maintenance and will feed on inappropriate policies and 
measures and ineffective public institutions (Krasniqi and Topxhiu 2012). 
 
Figure 1. The vicious cycle of informal economy and public expenditure and services 




Recently, there has been a rise in relevance of “asymmetry” approach emerging 
out of institutional theory. According to this approach, the more significant the 
asymmetry between formal and socially shared rules provided by informal institutions, 
the higher the propensity for subjects to indulge into informal economic practices 
(Gerxhani 1999; Williams and Franic 2016; Williams and Horodnic 2015). As such, the 
“asymmetry” approach does not treat informal norms and rules independently from 
formal rules and regulations. In fact, their interplay is vital to a successful 
implementation of formal rules. When the informal norms comply with formal rules and 
regulations, these will be complementary to the formal institutions and will serve as a 
reinforcing mechanism (Sartorious 2003), but when the two find themselves 
incompatible, informal rules will tend to be substitutive and to serve as an obstruction 
mechanism to the implementation of formal rules and regulations ( North 1990; Polese 
and Morris 2015; Williams and Franic 2016). Under the circumstance of the latter, an 
asymmetry or non-alignment is created, manifested by dissatisfaction, hindrance, and 
public distrust of formal institutions (Williams and Horodnic 2015; Williams and Franic 
2016), and suggest higher levels of informal economy (Gerxhani 1999). 
Given that welfare state programs are funded either by the general revenues of 
the central government budget and/or by mandatory individual contributions, both 
strongly depend on the state‟s ability to enforce taxes on registered economic activities, 
as well as to provide incentives to comply with the formal economy and contributory 
responsibilities. Both, inadequate welfare provisions and the inability to provide 
compliance with formal rules, break social trust in formal institutions. This marks the 
crossing point between economic informality, low compliance rate, and the size and 
effectiveness of welfare programs, and sets the ground base of our overall research 
assumption that the informal economy and welfare state programs interact in a negative 
feedback relationship.  
In our study, welfare state programs will imply exclusively the government‟s 
responsibility to ensure the security and adequacy of decent standard of living for all its 
citizens, through social security and labor market policies that work as mechanisms that 
provide protection for citizens at times of vulnerability. The type and the size of welfare 
state, in addition to the states‟ budgetary constraints, are influenced by many factors and 
pressures, both domestic and external, as discussed below in the literature review in 
Chapter I. Namely, as any arrangement between the state and markets, they involve the 
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government‟s willingness and political support to take on one different combinations of 
roles (Rainwater and Rein 1983). Accordingly, welfare state regime clusters are formed. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes three types of welfare state regimes based on the 
level of decommodification and the kind of social stratification they produce: liberal, 
conservative-corporatist and social democratic welfare states. Others have urged the 
need to introduce a “southern” type of welfare state as fourth type, not just as an 
underdeveloped subcategory of any another type (namely, Esping-Andersen‟s 
conservative type) (Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997), as well as an adequate type for post-
socialist countries because often they do not fit into the conventional cluster of regimes 
(Aidukaite 2011; Fenger 2007). 
Although studies about the socio-economic implications of welfare states have 
been present for quite some time, lately a growing interest with regard to labour market 
policies and their effects has emerged. Labor market policies include government 
intervention targeted at groups of the population with difficulties in the labour market, 
by facilitating training services, providing employment incentives, startup incentives, 
unemployment benefits, early retirement, and as such they are a common feature of 
welfare states. Disagreements among researchers are abundant in the literature when it 
comes to evaluating these policies. On the one side, we encounter scholars who suggest 
that welfare programs of the labour market policies kind are prone to moral hazard and 
cheating. As such they are ineffective, often hindering economic development (Pejovich 
1999; de Mooij 1999; Marie and Castello 2011), and creating long-term dependency, 
laziness and employment resistant personality (Ahmend and Miller 2000, cited in 
McDonald and Miller 2010; Lichter and Jayakory 2002; Perkins 2016), making way to 
the argument that welfare policies fail to challenge informal economy because they do 
not provide enough incentives to exit informality. On the other side, supporters of 
welfare state programs argue that an increase in expenditure in these policies may 
directly provide jobs, and also affects employment levels via job training and 
educational opportunities, which facilitate for their beneficiaries to develop higher 
levels of education and professional skills, and have an overall positive effect on the 
economy (McDonald and Miller 2010; Wolfe 2002), making way to our argument that 
welfare state benefits may also be effective in fighting informality.  
Heinze and Olk (1982) believe that the relationship between the formal and 
informal sectors depends “entirely on what sort of economic, social, and unemployment 
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policies are pursued” (197). Policies that could lead to an improvement in employment 
and welfare may minimize the operation space of informal economy and stigmatize 
informal economic behaviors. To that extent, Bosch and Esteban-Pretel‟s (2015) and 
Fugazza and Jasques (2003) provide support by claiming that welfare provision can be 
effective policies to attract individuals from the informal to the formal sector. Moreover, 
Williams and Renooy (2013) found significant negative correlations between the levels 
of undeclared economy and social protection expenditures, social protection 
effectiveness, and labour market policy expenditure in a number of European countries. 
Studies have shown that countries with lower GDP and higher socio-economic 
inequalities generally suffer more from informal economy (Aidukaite 2011, Williams 
and Renooy 2013). In the European context, with but a few exceptions, these countries 
are usually situated in Central and South Eastern Europe, and share a former socialist 
past (Williams and Renooy 2013). As such, we find it likely that many citizens in these 
countries shirk paying taxes as a response to the governments‟ failure to provide 
adequate support in cases of social risk (Aidukatite 2009, 35; Aidukaite 2010).   
2. Statement and purpose of the study 
 The interplay between informal economy and welfare state programs has already 
been explored and discussed to a fair extent; however, to the best of our knowledge no 
other studies have looked at this in the specific case of Kosovo, or included Kosovo in 
their research. Although local and international researchers and institutions have 
conducted studies with regard to informal economy and welfare state programs in 
Kosovo, generally they are discussed separately and no cases are found where the two 
subjects are intentionally discussed as possibly correlated matters.  
We understand that Kosovo is a young country, having declared independence 
only in 2008, and therefore it has received little attention in this regard. However, the 
fact that Kosovo is a former autonomous entity of Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, with a recent history of conflict, and a state in the making closely 
administered by the United Nations and European Union over the past 18 years, 
represents a unique case of study for our subjects of interest, not to be found in other 
post-socialist societies in the Central and South-Eastern Europe. Thereby, our study is 
an attempt to contribute to filling up this “knowledge gap”. As a citizen of Kosovo, it is 
only fair to see it as my responsibility to cover gaps in the knowledge related to Kosovo 
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and address its major issues. As social scientists, it is our responsibility to take 
advantage of first-hand knowledge and access to data and information that will be used 
to represent Kosovo in the scientific discussion of the relationship between informal 
economy and welfare state programs.  
We shall achieve that by taking a closer look at the problem of high informality 
that Kosovo faces, which may amount to as much as 37% of its GDP (Riinvest 2013), 
and discuss it in its context of low economic development, fragile institutions, low 
levels of public trust, high political instability, and high levels of unemployment. Then, 
we shall look at the welfare state programs currently active in Kosovo, namely social 
assistance and pensions, alongside its historical transition from a universal to a 
neoliberal welfare state system. In order to contextualize the level of informal economy 
and welfare state programs in Kosovo, we replicated Williams and Renooy‟s (2013) 
study and include Kosovo in the multi-country database, which allows us to identify 
Kosovo‟s position in relation to the negative relationship between the informal economy 
and the welfare state, in addition to which we looked at relationships between informal 
economy, institutional asymmetry and social capital.  
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CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Informal economy 
Definition 
The concept of informal economy, also known as „undeclared economy‟ or 
„shadow economy‟, originated in a series of urban labor market studies in Africa (Portes 
and Haller 2005). Economic anthropologist Keith Hart (1990), the first to adopt the 
term, used it as a way to depict the difference between his experience in Africa and 
what his English education had previously taught him, namely the widespread economic 
activity which, while not illegal in itself, he saw consistently carried on outside the 
scope and purview of administrative authority in African countries. 
However, in spite of developing countries being shown to be more vulnerable to 
economic informal practices due to fragile administration, low economic development, 
and socio-political background, the literature suggests that an informal sector is an 
inevitable part of every economy. Granted, the informal economy will encompass 
different things and practices in more developed nations from those in developing ones. 
Often, informal economic practices in developing countries are presented as a survival 
mechanism in the face of a disadvantaged and impotent regular economy, whereas in 
developed countries they are presented as a mere medium for improving quality of life 
(Gerxhani 1999; Wallace and Latcheva 2006; Williams and Nadin 2012). In either case, 
regardless of its manifestations, the informal economy is not seen as altogether 
performing a substitution role to the formal economy. Rather, it is argued that it is 
complementary to the formal one, and reported that individuals often participate 
simultaneously in both formal and informal economic activities (Williams and Nadin 
2012).  
The informal economy comprises a wide range of economic activities and has 
been variously defined in the academia. For our study purposes, hereafter we will refer 
to „informal economy‟ or „undeclared economy‟ as meaning all activities that while not 
criminal in their substantive outcomes, occur hidden from the state or ignore state legal 
regulations by taking resource to, e.g., informal employment, informal payment, under-
declaration of salaries, tax evasion, etc. Our definition is adapted from those offered by 
the International Labor Organizations (ILO, 1993) and Friedrich Schneider (2012). The 
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ILO defines informal economy as “an ensemble of unregistered economic activities that 
are driven by tax and social security evasion or by attempts to avoid compliance with 
certain legal standards and procedures” (cited in Krasniqi and Topxhiu 2012, 2). 
Schneider‟s (2012) definition, on the other hand, includes all market-based production 
of goods and services that, though legal in their substance, are purposefully hidden from 
the administrative authorities‟ sight. Both definitions exclude criminal and marginal 
non-taxed activities, and assume money as the medium of exchange, as well as some 
kind of state regulations and fiscal monopoly.  
Many authors list varying sets of reasons and motivations for subjects to engage 
in the informal sector of economy, namely the level of taxes and barriers imposed by 
administrative and labor regulations (De Soto 1989; Lehmann 2012; OECD 2004; 
Riinvest 2013), the lack of quality in public goods and services, corruption of 
government officials, maltreatment of taxpaying services (Schneider 2007), insufficient 
economic development, weak and complex legal framework, inefficient enforcement 
mechanisms, bureaucratic incompetence, and lack of trust towards state institutions 
(Gerxhani 1999). Similarly, we find arguments in the literature about the possible 
negative and positive effects of an informal economy. 
While, according to some authors, a high level of economic informality mainly 
entails tax-revenue losses, inhibition of economic growth as a result of lack of capital 
investment, poor working terms and conditions, and abridgment of state benefits for 
those engaged in informal sector (Gerxhani 1999; Hudson, Williams, Orviska, and 
Nadin 2012), others tend to underscore some positive effects of the informal economy 
for both the state and the market, especially in developing countries. According to these 
authors, informal activities perform a complementary role in the economy, by providing 
income to a large part of the population, who would otherwise be deprived of livelihood 
as a result of the incapacity of the formal sector to provide employment operating 
within the state‟s rules. It can also have a significant function in providing tranquility 
and preventing political upheaval, by granting services and goods that “lower the cost of 
consumption for formal workers and cost of production and distribution for formal 
firms” (Portes and Haller 2005, 420; see also Henry 1982; Rinvest 2013). This is known 
as the “shadow puzzle”, a situation where governments are rather tolerant to informal 
practices, despite the ever improving technological mechanisms to detect these 
activities, under the fear that an intensification of enforcement of labour regulations will 
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lead to higher unemployment (Ulyssea 2010). Accordingly, we encounter clashing 
arguments in the literature as to whether economic informality needs eradicating 
because it impedes economic growth, or it buffers fragile economies from total collapse 
by providing income to those who are excluded from the formal economy. 
Five schools of thought 
In order to typify the vast body of literature on the underlying motivations and 
positioning on tackling the informal sector, we can categorize it into five schools of 
thought (Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014; Hudson, Williams, and Nadin 
2012).  
The dualist school explains undeclared economy as a “direct consequence of the 
disparity between labor market demand and labor supply” (Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, 
and Williams 2014, 19; see also Hart 1973). This school of thought basically argues that 
individuals engage in informal economy as a survival strategy. This formed the earliest 
platform for discussing informal economy, which perceived it as an unwanted and 
unwelcomed phenomenon. Put simply, dualists assume that besides being completely 
separate and independent, the formal and informal versions of economy challenge each 
other. Measures should be taken such as the creation of new formal jobs, in order to 
bring about the demise of the informal economy.  The main drawback of this pioneering 
theory is the very assumption that the formal and informal dimensions of the economy 
are separated and completely independent of each other (Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov & 
Williams 2014), which often clashes with evidence of the two sectors being 
interdependent and reliant on each other. 
The legalist school focuses on the perspective of business in deciding whether or 
not to perform informal activities, pointing to the state as the sole responsible for the 
development of the informal economy by imposing harmful regulations (De Soto 1989; 
Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014). As a consequence, business owners 
may find it more convenient to conduct their businesses in an undeclared way, dodging 
financial and administrative burdens which pose rather significant expenses in money as 
well as time. If the cost of formality is too high for them to bear, firms engage in 
informality as a rational and voluntary choice (Danielsson 2016). The legalists therefore 
advocate less state interference and lower taxes as the viable solution in tackling 
informal economy. Studies have shown that state interference and repressive 
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enforcement often breed more informal economy, the so-called „paradox of state 
control‟ (Portes and Haller 2005, 409-410). For instance, the case of Cuba, known for 
its state control practices, echoes the impotence of obsessive control measures and 
heavy penalties for the wrongdoers, as the Cuban informal economy amounted to about 
40% of the national domestic product in 2000 (Henken 2002; Roque 2002). Evidence 
on the impact of taxation, on the other hand, is rather mixed, as are views on whether 
the tax rate is a lead determinant in explaining undeclared economy (Abdixhiku 2012). 
While the legalist school lists high taxes as a push factor causing subjects to partake in 
informal sector, studies indicate that the informal economy is generally higher in less 
developed countries where tax rates are lower, and lower in developed countries where 
tax rates are higher (Hudson, Williams, Orviska and Nadin 2012; Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 2000). This rather turns the spotlight from the taxation 
level to other factors that the legalist school fails to credit. 
The structuralist school is mainly focused on the role of capitalism. It 
commonly depicts labor informal sector as “waged employment conducted under 
degrading, low-paid and exploitative „sweatshop-like‟ conditions by marginalized 
populations who do this work out of necessity” (Hundson, Williams, Orviska, and 
Nadin 2012, 101;). Emerging from late capitalism, as an end product of economic 
globalization and increasing global competition, informal economic practices are seen 
as “a new facet of contemporary capitalism”, and jobs conducted under this sector 
occupy the bottom tier in employment ranks, due to downgraded labor terms and 
conditions. As such, the informal sector should be eradicated from the economic realm 
by all means (Hudson, Williams, Orvisnska, and Nadin 2012). Contrary to legalist 
theories, which call for a neoliberal approach to the economy, structuralists call for 
more regulations and state intervention in order to tackle informal practices, amidst both 
small and large businesses (Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014). However, 
the assumption scripted in the structuralist school of thought that all the informal 
economy amounts to is low-paid waged work has been continually under scrutiny, as 
studies have shown that informal wage rates appear to be as fluctuating and polarized as 
those in the formal labor market. Moreover, as some formally employed individuals 
receive two wages, a declared official and an undeclared unofficial salary in the form of 
envelope wage, several scholars have even started to question whether there can be jobs 
that are neither formal nor informal (Hudson, Williams, Orvinska, and Nadin 2012).  
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The voluntarist school provides a rather individual-centric explanation to 
informal economy. In this view, the tendency to engage or conduct undeclared 
economic activities boils down to a rational choice reached by individuals and firms, 
after evaluating cost-benefits ratios for compliance and non-compliance (Dzhekova, 
Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014). This approach hinges on taxpayers‟ morals and 
their perception of the competence of state authorities. If they “assess that the expected 
cost (financial and/or administrative) of being caught and punished is lower than the 
extra profit made by evasion, they will opt to conceal their activities from the 
authorities” (Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014, 21; Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972). There seems to be a strong consensus within the scientific community 
with regard to the relationship between undeclared economy and rational choice 
decision, expressed in compliance costs and audit rates as two of the explaining 
determinants.  
Lastly, the complementary school occupies a rather different corpus of 
explanations, which offers a primarily societal perspective. It argues that there are 
incentives other than financial ones encouraging people to engage in undeclared 
activities, namely for the purpose of “reinforcing of social ties, improvement of the 
position in community, or simply a desire to help neighbors, acquaintances and kin” 
(Dzhekova, Franio, Mishkov, and Williams 2014, 21). However, these activities are 
labeled as positive rather than harmful, and as such they should be nurtured rather than 
tackled. In fact, Gaughan and Ferman (1987) strongly opposed the argument made by 
the first three schools of thought that the informal economy has developed as a result of 
glitch or failure of the economic system of distribution, claiming that a significant part 
of the undeclared economy, “with an emphasis on its mutual obligation and 
reciprocity”, is part of a “nexus of social glue that makes the formation and maintenance 
of social life possible”, and that failing to understand this social character of the 
informal economy “leads us to an inadequate picture of economic life in traditional and 
postindustrial societies” (Gaughan and Ferman 1987, 25).  
Out of the above-listed schools of thought, the legalist, structuralist and 
voluntarist approaches captivated the center of our attention in the later discussion of 
the hypothetical explanatory relationship between the informal economy and welfare 
regimes, dictated by applied state policies and governance quality. That is because all 
three schools share a common feature in their approach to informal economy, which is 
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the effect of governance quality. While in the legalist perspective those are expressed as 
inadequate state interventions and regulation seen as intrusive and burdensome by firms 
and entrepreneurs, in the structuralist and voluntarist perspectives, the effects of 
governance quality are expressed as, respectively, poor state policies providing 
insufficient protection to firms/individuals, who then seek support in the informal sector 
as a survival strategy; and as ineffective enforcing mechanisms and deficient policies 
that lower the expected cost of getting caught performing informal economic activities, 
causing it to be outweighed by the expected gains. However, each of the three schools 
entails its unique components, which will be discussed in the following sections. The 
legalist approach entails regulations and models of tax systems applied in a given 
country; the voluntarist approach entails social capital as an indicator of individuals‟ 
behaviors in relation to the undeclared economy; and the structuralist approach entails 
welfare regime and protection programs as a reflection of state actors‟ commitment to 
creating public goods and solidarity as an encouraging mechanism for citizens to 
comply and cooperate with state institutions.  
Emerging explanations 
For much of the past century, informal economic practices, such as informal 
employment for avoiding tax dues, was dominated by the aforementioned dualist 
school, otherwise known as the „dual economies‟ approach. Informal economic 
activities were seen as remnants of underdeveloped and traditional societies, surviving 
within the traditional sectors of dual economies, unlike the modern, progressive and 
advanced societies which have subscribed to a formal form of economy (Williams, 
Kedir, and Nadin 2013). Such theories propose increasing government control and 
detection mechanisms, in order to curb the informal economic sector. Even though 
recent studies find the effects of offensive mechanisms against the informal economy to 
be less than conclusive (Williams and Horodnic 2016), the dualists‟ understanding of 
informal economy as part of a characteristic to which underdeveloped or developing 
societies are prone, that of poor governance, remains a valid blueprint to this day. Most 
of the drivers the literature points out for businesses and/or individuals to engage in 
informal economy, derive from various aspects of quality of governance (Lacko 2000; 
Dreher et al 2005; Johnson et al. 2000, in Williams and Nadin 2012; Torgler and 
Schneider 2009), levels of corruption, and trust towards state institutions (Gerxhani 
1999; Hudson, Williams, and Nadin 2012; Williams and Franic 2016; Williams and 
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Horodnic 2016), the negative features of which are all to be found mainly in developing 
countries (Friedman et al 2000).  
Lately, a new “asymmetry” approach has been emerging out of institutional 
theory. According to this approach, informal economy arises when there is an evident 
“lack of alignment of the codified laws and regulations of society‟s formal institutions 
with its informal institutions, namely the norms and values of its citizens that produce 
socially shared unwritten rules and understandings” (Williams and Franic 2016, 2). The 
more significant the asymmetry between formal and socially shared rules provided by 
informal institutions, the higher the propensity for subjects to indulge into informal 
economic practices (Gerxhani 1999; Williams and Franic 2016; Williams and Horodnic 
2015). For instance, the practice of envelope wage or of fully undeclared employment 
occurs when employee and employer adhere to shared rules based on informal 
agreements, rather than to the formal institutional regulations.  
In addition to providing a different take on informal economy, this approach 
hence introduces new implications on how informal economy should be tackled, 
shifting the focus to the significance of unforced cooperation and compatibility of 
formal rules. The theory does not see informal norms and values as independent of 
formal rules and regulations. Often they are a direct response to the nature and 
compatibility of the latter. When the informal norms comply with formal rules and 
regulations, these will be complementary to the formal institutions and will serve as a 
reinforcing mechanism (Sartorious 2003). However, when the two configurations find 
themselves incompatible, informal institutions will tend to be substitutive and to serve 
as an obstruction mechanism to the implementation of formal rules and regulations 
(North 1990; Polese and Morris 2015; Williams and Franic 2016). Potential 
incompatibility, non-alignment or asymmetry is broadly affected by the incompetence 
and ineffectiveness of formal institutions and their upholders, and it is expressed in 
dissatisfaction, hindrance, and public distrust towards formal institutions (Williams and 
Horodnic 2015; Williams and Franic 2016).  
On that basis, we find a related avenue in the discussion of undeclared economy 
in relation to social capital as a composition of informal values and rules. Putnam 
(1993), along with Knack and Keefer (1997), are among the pioneers advocating the 
significance of social capital in governance quality and economic welfare (La Porta et 
al. 1999; Slemrod 1998).  Putnam (1993, 167) originally defined social capital as 
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“features of social organizations (…) that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions”. He therefore claims that cooperation is easier in 
societies with a larger inherent stock of social capital. He disagreed with game theorists‟ 
views, according to which cooperation is higher when involved subjects possess 
abundant information about each other‟s past behaviors, or when they engage in 
indefinitely repeated transactions, so that non-compliance will face punishment in future 
transactions. If these were valid explanatory factors, Putnam argued, impersonal 
cooperation would be rare and in decline, contrary to what seems to be common in 
much of the modern world. Alternatively, Putnam advanced social capital as the main 
enabler of widespread voluntary and spontaneous cooperation. Social capital by itself 
provides the circumstances needed for subjects to engage in cooperation, according to 
game theorists – namely, those of easily spotting defectors and the availability of 
abundant and reliable information –, and it does so at a much wider and impersonal 
scale.  
To Putnam‟s understanding, social capital is a complex setting of three elements 
that causally partake in each other‟s structure, namely: social trust, civic norms and a 
dense network of civic engagement. Trust, according to him, “lubricates cooperation, 
and cooperation itself breeds trust” (Putnam 1993, 171). However, social trust is by no 
means blind. It involves predictions about the actions of the other independent subjects, 
and is ingrained in the civic norms shared by the individuals within a community. The 
most important of such norms is that of reciprocity. Putnam defines generalized 
reciprocity as a “continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time 
unrequired or imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectation that a benefit granted 
now should be repaid in the future” and as such the norm of reciprocity “serves to 
reconcile self-interest and solidarity” through a combination of “short-term altruism and 
long term self-interest” (Putnam 1993, 172). 
Such norms are established and applied in communities pervaded by dense civic 
networks. Engagement in horizontal networks, such as neighborhood and religious 
associations, sport clubs, cultural associations, trade unions among others, creates 
networks of civic engagement. Networks of civic membership ease “communication 
and improve the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals”. 
Therefore, other things being equal, “the greater the communication (both direct and 
indirect) among participants, the greater their mutual trust and the easier they will find it 
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to cooperate” (Putnam 1993, 174). Citizens who interact in many horizontal networks 
are likely to develop “strong norms of acceptable behavior and to convey their mutual 
expectations to one another in many reinforcing encounters”, norms which are then 
reinforced “by the network of relationships that depend on the establishment of 
reputation for keeping promises and accepting the norms of local community regarding 
behavior” (Putnam 1993, 173). The higher the density of such networks within a 
community, the higher the propensity of its citizens to participate in mutually beneficial 
cooperation to the advantage of social capital. In this regard, such social capital 
composition, or lack thereof, will be the defining reason why one society may prevail 
over the over, as in the case of the economic success of northern part of Italy over the 
south depicted in Putman‟s work. Basing our argument on Putnam‟s work, the lack of 
social capital in a society is conducive to its incapacity to perform in prime socio-
economic development, which is the soil for informal economy in the first place, as 
supported throughout the literature review.  
Moreover, drawing on Granovetter‟s (1973), Putnam‟s views that a high level of 
social capital in a community cannot rest on strong network ties, the likes of kinship and 
intimate friendship, which are considered as less effective in sustaining social cohesion 
and widespread collective action than weak ties, such as those of acquaintanceship and 
shared membership in voluntary associations. He explains that weak ties are more likely 
to connect people of different affiliations, unlike strong ones which tend to be more 
focused within particular groups. On another aspect, Putnam regarded the prevalence of 
vertical networks, which are based on asymmetric obligations and exchanges of the 
patron-client type, as harmful to social capital, because clientelism is bound to 
undermine group organization and solidarity. Citizens enrolled in vertical networks are 
more exposed to opportunism, by both parties, which does not provide the right 
circumstances to develop cooperative norms, trust, nor to engaging in mutual 
collaboration (Putnam 1993).  
Knack and Keefer (1997), building up on Putnam‟s work, introduced new 
empirical evidence, making three major contributions. First, they showed that social 
capital contributes significantly to economic growth and prosperity by looking at the 
impact of social capital on both growth and investments rates across section of 29 
countries, using measures of trust, civic norms – namely, civic cooperation – and 
horizontal networking – namely, associational activity, finding that such social capital 
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variables display a significant positive relationship to economic growth and investment, 
as shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.  
  
Figure 2. The positive relationship between growth and trust (Knack and Keefer 1997, 
1265) 
 
Figure 3. The positive relationship between investment and trust (Knack and Keefer 
1997, 1268)  
Nevertheless, they also noted that causality of these relationships could go in both 
directions, as while trust could facilitate growth and prosperity, it could just as well be a 
byproduct of growth and prosperity.   
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Secondly, although they were able to empirically support a positive relation 
between trust and civic cooperation, as exhibited in the figure below, Knack and 
Keefer‟s empirical test failed to find evidence that dense horizontal networking 
reinforces trust and civic norms, as suggested by Putnam. They concluded that 
“horizontal networks are unrelated to trust and civic norms and to economic 
performances” (Knack and Keefer 1997, 1284). 
And, thirdly, they surfaced the importance of two sources of trust and civic 
norms; low social polarization and formal institutional rules. These two prohibit 
“government from acting arbitrarily” and “are associated with the development of 
cooperative norms and trust” (Knack and Keefer 1997, 1284). 
 
 
Figure 4. The relationship between civic cooperation and trust (Knack and Keefer 
1997, 1259) 
The contributions by Putnam (1993) and Knack and Keefer (1997) resonate to 
institutional asymmetry theory. Even though, admittedly, neither of them refers to 
undeclared economy as such, their elaborations on social capital, government 
performance and economic development reflect on institutional asymmetry theory‟s 
core concepts, those of formal and informal institutions and their alignment. As 
previously discussed, in cases of misalignment between formal and informal 
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institutions, the former find themselves challenged by the latter, in which case mutual 
cooperation, trust and social capital as a whole will deteriorate. Both government and 
economic performance are jeopardized as a consequence, informal economic structure 
may thrive as an alternative medium of survival mechanism, and participation in it will 
become a form of protest against the formal guidelines.  
It follows from the above that social capital and generalized trust should play a 
major role in the size of undeclared economy, and Abdixhiku (2012, 83) found ample 
support in the literature for the relevance of the negative relationship between trust, tax 
morale, and the undeclared economy. According to this view, trust and tax morale 
surpass the relevance and effectiveness of formal deterrence and supervising methods 
that were strongly encouraged by the dualist approach.  
Tax morale, or civic norm as referred in our study, on the other hand, defined as 
the “intrinsic motivation” to tax compliance, measures not individuals‟ behavior but 
rather their attitude (Torgler and Schneider 2006). As an indicator used in the literature 
for evaluating the proposition on institutional asymmetry, tax morale represents an 
element of civic norms in the structure of social capital. Preliminary tax morale research 
dates all the way back to Schmolders (1970) and Strumpel (1969), who tried to connect 
economics and social psychology by reiterating that economic behaviors should be 
analyzed from a motivational perspective that goes beyond the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical economics (Torgler and Schneider 2006). Emphasis on tax morale came as 
a response to the poor empirical fitting of deterrence models, which assumed the extent 
of the undeclared economy to be negatively correlated with the probability of detection 
and the degree of punishment (as in Allingham and Sandmo 1972), and which predicted 
far too little compliance and far too much informal practices. In many states, the level of 
deterrence was shown to be too low to explain the actual high level of tax compliance 
(Torgler and Schneider 2006). Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1983), Frey (1997), Alm 
(1999) and later on Torgler (2003), in their empirical analyses, found that tax morale 
had the strongest significant impact on the size of the undeclared economy, as compared 
to other variables.  More than a mere indicator, tax morale became a revolutionary 
approach in tackling the informal economy. Instead of the state pursuing compliances 
through “close supervising and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed procedures and 
centralized structures within the contexts of a low commitment, low trust, and 
adversarial culture”, the tax morale approach encourages “a high trust, high 
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commitment culture (…) that aligns with the values of citizens with the formal rules so 
as to generate internal control” (Williams and Horodnic 2016, 324). 
Informal economy in South Eastern Europe and transition societies 
The informal economy was not inexistent in socialist countries by any stretch, 
despite the lack of public acknowledgment of it. The “orthodox, ideological hostility 
against the „petty bourgeoisie‟, „refrigerator-socialism‟, and all forms of individuals in 
the general”, forced official statistics to reveal very little about the size of informality 
(Portes and Borocz 1998, 17). Nevertheless, estimates provided by Grossman (1989) 
claim that household incomes coming from informal sources in the Soviet Union during 
the 1970s could have had gone up to 66%, depending of the regions. Moreover, data 
obtained in Hungary during state socialism show that around 40% of all population 
income came from participation in the informal sector (Kolonsi 1984, cited in Portes 
and Borocz 1998). Informal practices were also identified in the Former Socialist 
Republics of Yugoslavia, particularly during times of crisis (Woodward 1995).  
However, the undeclared economy became a major subject of studies in the 
South Eastern European societies, given that these societies faced substantive 
institutional, social, political, and cultural changes during their transition process. 
Decades after beginning the transition to a market-based economy and a democratic 
governing system, high rates of informal economy remain a persistent feature across 
most of South-Eastern European transitional societies. Although progress has been 
made, recent estimations continue to show a high prevalence of the informal economy 
amidst these countries.  Bulgaria registers an estimate of 31% of GDP, Macedonia 35%, 
Croatia 28%, Romania 28%, while others have shown more progress such as Slovenia 
23%, and Hungary 22%, and so forth (Williams and Renooy 2013; Schneider 2015; 
Williams and Franic 2016, Williams and Boric 2013). Governments are thereby 
regularly losing revenues that could be allocated in funding capital investments, public 
goods and services, and social protection programs.  
Moving from a centrally planned to a market based economy requires a critical 
set of adjustments and accomplishments in all areas (Abdixhiku 2013). Most centrally 
planned economies in former socialist South Eastern Europe employed a tax system 
similar to that in the Soviet Union. Most of the tax revenues came from “profit, 
turnover, and payroll taxes levied on state-owned enterprises” (Martinez-Vazquez and 
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McNab 1997, 3). The profit tax, the main source of revenues in centrally planned 
economies, was used to collect and concentrate resources and to regulate the 
enterprises‟ income. The tax rates on profits were typically set at 50 or 60 percent, with 
registered cases of countries that had progressive tax structures with marginal rates at up 
to 100 percent (Martinez-Vasquez and McNab 1997). Turnover taxes were applied 
mainly to consumer goods and some services, while wage and payroll taxes were 
withheld at the state-owned enterprises for the purpose of funding social expenditures. 
Deductions from individual income were either trivial or completely absent. Basically, 
the state made all the decision over production and consumption of goods and services 
and took on the responsibility to be the sole provider of social services and social 
protection benefits, by using the revenues generated by profit and taxes of state owned 
enterprises, and often used its authority to retroactively adapt the tax rates and 
administrative procedures to perceived tax revenue needs. The rather small number of 
taxpaying subjects implied that the state could have a reportedly 100% audit rate, while 
payment methods that ran through the monopolistic operation of state banks ensured 
administration and enforcement (Martinez-Vasquez and McNab 1997).  
The proven resilience of informal economy in the post-socialist societies, 
according to Abdixhiku (2013) comes down to four main arguments pointed out in the 
related literature.  
The first argument, developed by Kornai (1990), argues that a major reason 
behind non-compliance may be found in the citizens‟ lack of experience in paying taxes 
(Abdixhiku 2013). Critical changes in this respect in the newly established market-
based economy, therefore, met with bewildered citizens in the face of unfamiliar tax 
demands. The fact that the average citizen was being explicitly taxed for the first time 
created a propitiatory culture for tax evasion (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997) 
The second argument, in a more related vein to that of the dualist approach 
above, relates incompliance to the collapse of the formal prevention structures against 
tax evasion, during the transition process and the implementation of the new tax 
systems. According to this view, transitional post-socialist economies experienced an 
utter lack of rule of law (Abidixhiku 2013). As a result of the nature of the previous 
centralized economy, tax collection mechanisms were often left underdeveloped and 
unsophisticated. Deterrence mechanisms against tax evasion were inadequate, if not 
non-existent, providing no infrastructure to monitor the practices of the newly 
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institutionalized and ever growing private sector and market economy (Martinez- 
Vazquez and McNab 1997). Under these circumstances, the process of building up a 
new and compatible tax system was long, difficult (Abdixhiku 2013), and in some cases 
is still ongoing. 
Faced by such necessity, fundamental questions were raised as to what type of 
tax structure and how should it be adopted. Adopting a modern system much like to 
those in Western Europe or in North America raised numerous red flags from 
international experts, who warned against the risks of adopting such a strategy in the 
face of the significant differences in transitional societies, regarding their actual 
economies, wider institutional frameworks, and administrative capabilities. However, 
such warnings were largely unheeded (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997). Allegedly, 
the most serious mistake was that of focusing primarily on modernizing tax policies, 
while relegating the tax administration infrastructure and taxpayers‟ issues to a remote 
secondary importance: “the focus shifted to tax policy reforms, albeit in many cases 
without considering the limited capacity of the tax administration” (Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab 1997, 29).  As a consequence, these societies ultimately built a complex tax 
system and regulations, requiring a high level of bureaucracy, together with poor 
administrative infrastructure and incompetent personnel unable to process them in face 
of the exponential growth of the private sector.  
The third and fourth arguments focus on the direct relationship between 
individuals and formal institutions. The third argument belongs to the above defined 
structuralist school, and it includes two social capital components; trust and tax 
morality. Low level of trust towards public and formal institutions was registered across 
most post-socialist countries, in hand with a high perception of corruption (Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 1997), a possible legacy of the former socialist state (Wallace and 
Letcheva 2006). Trust becomes even lower the further one moves towards the Eastern 
and South-Eastern areas of Europe (Wallace and Letcheva 2006). This induces high 
asymmetry between formal institutions and socially shared rules, as provided by 
informal institutions. Ultimately, this will result in a likelihood of the emergence and/or 
maintenance of informal economic practices in their economies (Gerxhani 1999; 
Williams and Horodnic 2015). Accordingly, low levels of tax morality were registered 
across most post-socialist societies (Torgler 2004). As state institutions are little trusted 
by the population, who see them as not representing their interests, participation in the 
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informal economy becomes increasingly reasonable, justifiable and even popular. The 
moral cost decreases as the stigmatization of such practices diminishes, only to flare up 
further informal practices. 
Lastly, the fourth argument, close to the voluntarist school, argues for an 
apparent disparity between taxation and the supply of public goods having triggered a 
sense of detachment from the state in South and East European transition societies, thus 
undermining the willingness to comply with the new tax system (Alm, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Schneider 2004; Torgler 2004). This line of argument is pivotal to our 
purpose, since it includes the relationship, or lack thereof, between the undeclared 
economy and the states‟ welfare provision. Recent studies have emerged in support of 
this argument. According to Williams (2012), there is a strong correlation between 
market-based economies with higher levels of market interventions, social protection, 
redistribution via social transfers and equality, and lower levels of informality. He fairly 
makes the disclaimer that these correlations should be treated with caution, for lack of 
evidence supporting a cause-effect relationship. Nevertheless, he tentatively suggests 
that undeclared economies might be reduced not only by pursuing conventional tax 
policy and administration measures, but also by modernizing and modifying welfare 
regime programs through higher levels of expenditure on state intervention in the labor 
market and social protections, coupled with redistribution via social transfers (Williams 
2012). 
Informal economy in Kosovo 
Kosovo, located in the Southeast of Europe, conforms to the informal economy 
pattern found in other post-socialist societies, accounting for as high as 30% to 40% of 
GDP (Riinvest 2013). Yet, we believe that the case of Kosovo has a unique nature and 
particular features. One of its main peculiarities is that the transition of former socialist 
states into democratic societies and market-based economies during the 1990s found 
Kosovo as a formerly autonomous province of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, having had its autonomous status revoked in 1989. Kosovo had no 
independent executive legitimacy, and was highly dependent on directive policies 
delivered from the central authority in Belgrade, the former capital city of Yugoslavia. 
This situation produced a low level of economic development and a high level of 
unemployment, making Kosovo one the poorest and least developed provinces in 
Yugoslavia (Stambolieva 2012).  
 23
Upon 1999‟s military international intervention in Kosovo, which put an end to 
the war between the Serbian authorities and the ethnic Albanians‟ resistance, 
international organizations were responsible for designing economic policies and 
restoring economic development. The European Commission‟s and World Bank‟s 
reconstruction and recovery program had three specific goals. The first was to develop 
an open and transparent market economy, which could “quickly provide jobs to a large 
part of the Kosovar population” by “restarting the rural economy, encouraging the 
development of the private sectors, and addressing the issues of public enterprises”. The 
second goal aimed at supporting a restart of the public administration and establishing 
transparent, sustainable and effective institutions by “strengthening and reforming 
existing formal and parallel structures, and by developing new institutions where 
needed”, particular focus being directed to “setting up the central institutions that are 
key for economic recovery, developing municipal governance, and restoring law and 
order through an effective police and judiciary”. The last goal was to mitigate the 
impact of the conflict and the legacy of the 1990s by “restoring living conditions (…) 
rehabilitating the infrastructure networks needed for economic development (…) and 
upgrading social service delivery (education and health)” (European Commission and 
World Bank 1999, 3). 
The same report showed high enthusiasm as to the speed of development in 
private sector activities, particularly in the services sector and retail, admiring the 
“exceptional sense of entrepreneurship by the Kosovars”, and it emphasized the 
importance of newly formed small and medium-sized enterprises as the “main source of 
growth and employment in most transition economies”. Locals were also praised for 
their commitment to restoring and improving social services, as schools started with 
unpaid teachers, testifying a high level of social solidarity. 
Over 15 years later, however, all macroeconomic and social indicators ranked 
Kosovo among the poorest countries in Europe. There is a high level of unemployment, 
fluctuating annually around 35% and 40%, a poverty level as high as 30% (INDEP 
2015), slow economic growth, low level of public trust and high political instability 
(KCSS 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016), along with the aforementioned high level of economic 
informality. 
The European Commission and the World Bank were requested to assist and 
direct Kosovo in her post-conflict economic reconstruction. Their mission revolved 
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around the privatization of socially and state-owned enterprises and the formalization of 
the economy. The general idea was “to co-opt rather than confront informality” 
(Danielsson 2016, 6). They framed the problem of informality under a legalist approach, 
as the outcome of a lack of formal institutions and regulations yet to be consolidated 
after the war. The solution was plainly to establish a “formal institutional regulatory 
framework and provide businesses with formalizing incentives” (Danielsson 2016, 6). 
In a later report, the World Bank (2003) acknowledged that the size informal economy 
remained high despite the introduction of regulations, but they interpreted this as a 
coping strategy due to the lack of the formal sector‟s capacity, and insisted that the 
ongoing implementation of social policies would eventually drag the actors operating in 
the informal sector into the formal one. 
Regardless of an improved regulatory environment in which registration 
procedures were simplified and entrepreneurs had to face fewer administrative barriers, 
informality remained high. The World Bank kept much the same position on the matter 
after Kosovo‟s declaration of independence in 2008. In partnership with the local 
government, “the World Bank continued to act upon informality as a spinoff to 
problems in the formal institutional framework” and claimed that “informal economy 
remained sizeable due to the faulty regulations” (Danielsson 2016, 8). Namely, lengthy 
and costly registration and licensing procedures were emphasized as the main push 
factors for businesses to operate into informal economy, therefore it should be no 
surprise that informal sector is this large (Danielsson 2016). However, no support for 
this claim was found in the various surveys of the business community carried out from 
2008 until 2013. For instance, in 2008, according to the World Bank and International 
Finance Cooperation (2009), only 4.6% of businesses named licensing and permits as a 
major constraint. By 2013, 95% of businesses were formally registered, and practices of 
the informal sector were listed to be the major constraint in everyday economic 
activities by the surveyed firms (World Bank and International Finance Corporation 
2013). The World Bank nevertheless repeatedly decided to encourage top-down 
regulatory arrangements for institutional framework improvement, as the means to 
formalize the informal sector.  
The World Bank‟s call for further formal regulatory improvement has been met 
by strong criticism by Ana Danielsson (2015; 2016). She argues that the ineffectiveness 
of the World Bank and other international institutions, such as the International 
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Monetary Fund, in tackling informal economy in Kosovo derived from consistently 
ignoring social capital and the configuration of power relations in the post-conflict and 
today‟s Kosovo, and that the policies they imposed have only made informal practices 
become an innate resource of the newborn formal economy.
1
 
The World Bank did not take the fact into consideration, that since the end of the 
war, all the informal structure of the parallel state and illicit activities of war 
entrepreneurs were transformed into “socio-economic differentiations and an unequal 
resource of distribution” (Danielsson 2016, 11), testifying to the continuing claims 
about unfair business environment by the private businesses (Riinvest 2013). For 
instance, the vertical networking possessed by the Kosovo Liberation Army leaders‟ 
close circle and the power configuration, which were established during the conflict, 
strengthened shortly after the war in Kosovo, as from 2004 onwards Kosovo has been 
governed by the former war front leaders, and the members of this elite circle continued 
to appropriate political and economic authority (IKS 2010). 
As a consequence, the World Bank‟s regulatory arrangements did not have the 
same effect to all the business actors; rather they unfairly placed some businesses in 
better positions than others, by allowing them to “win contracts in openly announced 
procurement processes, win public bids despite their operating license having been 
withdrawn, gain licit and illicit profits from processes of privatization, and benefit from 
the protection and involvement of criminal groups” (Danielsson 2016, 12). The less 
privileged businesses engage in practices of bending formal regulations, much as the 
dominant businesses do, construing informality as the taken for granted way of doing 
business. Consequently, informal economic practices have gradually but surely become 
a social norm. 
According to Danielsson‟s main argument, informal economic practices became 
modeled after formal regulations to mimic the requirements ordinarily associated with 
the formal economy, such as contracts, receipts and bookkeeping. Underneath ritualistic 
compliance with formal rules, informal economic practices have become an integral 
                                                          
1
 We acknowledge that Danielsson‟s use of the concept of social capital aligns with Bourdieu‟s and other 
sociologists‟ definition of social capital as a resource of the agents, which differs from that used by 
Putnam as a collective resource (Portes 1998). To our interest this form of use of highly hierarchized 
social ties to powerful individuals‟ or cliques‟ advantage will be treated as Putnam‟s “vertical” patronage 
networks, and therefore noxious to social capital in the latter‟s sense. 
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component of the formal economy (...) by enabling a further institutionalization of 
informality through the use and bending (rather than abandonment) of rules and 
regulations, informal economic practices support the façade of a formal economy while 
tacitly undermining it from within (Danielsson 2016, 12). 
Obviously, Danielsson‟s contribution urges us to shift the focus more in line 
with the structuralist and institutional asymmetry approach, which in the case of Kosovo 
has been largely overshadowed by the legalist perspective inherent to the international 
institutions‟ assistance programs. She has been a pioneer in that regard, and her work 
represents a major cornerstone for our study.  
2. Welfare state policies 
Definitional debates 
Since the end of World War II, welfare states have formed a cornerstone of 
capitalist democracies in most Western European Countries.  Consensually, by welfare 
state we understand a “state‟s involvement in the distribution and redistribution of 
welfare in a given country” (Aidukaite 2009, 24). Admittedly, this definition was used 
in the social policy research mainly to study rich capitalist democracies, while the rest 
of the countries were termed as “countries having some form of social policy” which 
affect “the social status and life opportunities for families, individuals, or various social 
groups” (Aidukaite 2009, 24). Although the notion of social policy has been perceived 
at times as a synonym for that of welfare state, its usage in the literature is often 
inclined to a broader sense of state activities that have redistribution impact (Aidukaite 
2009) and often predate the institutionalized polity commitment in the capitalist 
democracies to ensure welfare support for their citizens which was largely established in 
most of the European countries only by the end of World War II (Rainwater and Rein 
1984). As such, the modern welfare state mainly consists of two main kinds of 
government-sponsored programs, transfers and services. The former includes providing 
income to individuals in particular need in order to ensure income adequacy, either via 
cash or in-kind transfers. The latter includes providing services to individuals ranging 
from “social protection to improvement in human capital, to provision of cultural 
advantages (Rainwater and Rein 1983, 111) 
  Titmuss (1974) believed that policies designed to allow and facilitate societies to 
move towards equality should be the pillars of how a good society ought to be 
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organized. Likewise, Wilensky (1975) believed that the minimum standard of living 
should be guaranteed as a social right in the welfare state. He suggested that this could 
be attained through eight core policy areas, namely (1) pensions, death benefits, and 
disability insurance; (2) health insurance; (3) family policies; (4) education; (5) jobs 
injury insurance; (6) unemployment subsidies and related labor-market policies; (7) war 
victims‟ benefits; (8) and miscellaneous aid to the poor (Wilensky 2002); the essence of 
welfare state is “government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health 
and safety, education and housing assured to every citizen as a social right, and not as a 
charity” (Wilensky 2002, 211). He then went on to claim that countries that invested 
greatly in their social security had a correspondingly high annual growth per capital, 
low inflation and low unemployment. In the same vein, Esping-Andersen (1990) argued 
that governments should prioritize welfare policies that encourage extensive and 
universal state programs which will promote a broad sense of social solidarity and 
provide social integration through the distribution of risk across generations, classes, 
and educational levels. 
For the purposes of this study, inspired by the definition of welfare state in the 
Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (2003) and in keeping with its incipient stage in 
Kosovo, welfare state will imply no more than the government‟s responsibility to ensure 
the security and adequacy of a decent standard of living for all its citizens, through 
social security and labor market policies as mechanisms that provide protection for 
citizens at times of vulnerability.  
Each government‟s approach to ensuring a certain level of welfare for its 
citizens comes in different arrangements between state and market. Depending on 
ideology and political agenda, resources and the social coalitions supporting it, a 
government may take on one or more of the following eight roles in this regard; (1) it 
can play no role at all, (2) it can regulate the provisions of the resources by market-
based institutions, (3) it can mandate other institution to provide the resources, (4) it can 
encourage other institutions to provide the resources, (5) it can finance, but not provide, 
the provision of the resources out its own budget, (6) it can directly finance and provide 
benefits in form of cash, (7), it can directly finance and provide goods and services and 
(8) it can both finance and provide cash benefits, goods and services (Rainwater and 
Rein 1984, 117). The character and the size of the welfare state will depend on the 
combinations in which the government engages. To that extent, scholars surveying 
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welfare-state types and variation of social policies in all countries found that welfare 
state models are not linearly distributed, but rather they cluster into regime types 
(Aidukaite 2009; Bonolli 1997; Castel and Mitchel 1993; Esping Andersen 1990; 
Ferrera 1996; Korpi and Palmer 1998; Leibfried 1992; Staroff 1994). 
Welfare state typology and regimes continue to constitute a major focus of 
academic debate, as there is yet no agreement between scholars on the ultimate cluster 
of regime types capable of encompassing and classifying all variations of welfare state 
models found in the world. Similarly, the rise and the variation of welfare state in any 
particular country or region in the first place have been met by the same intensity of 
discussion in the literature. Scholars engage on an ongoing exchange of arguments that 
aim at explaining the circumstances under which a particular welfare state regime came 
to be developed and why. A remarkable contribution to the intensity of these debates 
was prompted by the latest fundamental transformation in Central and South East 
European countries upon the fall of communism. This transformation created various 
hybrid and at times unpredictable welfare state regimes, which did not fit well into the 
main cluster models prevailing in academic discussion at the time.  
While the rise and the variations of welfare state have been a subject of strong 
discussion amidst scholars, most of the literature suggests that there is a connection 
between welfare generosity and inequality, and conclusions extracted from cross-
national data on individual and household incomes over the course of past decade 
indicate a significant and negative link between the two. A point increase in welfare 
spending as a percentage of GDP presumably decreases poverty rates by four 
percentage points (Brooks and Manza 2007), while in turn lower levels of poverty and 
inequality are said to ensure a strong effect on the state of the economy and economic 
growth. Nevertheless, given the acknowledgment that economy and the welfare state are 
interconnected (Esping-Andersen 1990), we find in our literature review very few 
discussions of a potential link between the welfare state and informal economy. 
Origins of welfare states 
The emergence of welfare states and their pattern variations open up the way for 
many questions with regard to the driving forces behind the emergence and the 
application of a particular model of welfare state in the first place. This matter concerns 
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a large part of the literature on the welfare state, involving several explanatory 
approaches. 
The “industrialist” approach sees economic growth and its demographic 
implication as the original cause of the emergence of welfare states (Wilensky 1975).  
According to this approach, welfare states first emerged in societies undergoing major 
economic growth due to rapid industrialization. Together with record economic growth, 
went unprecedented medical and health-related technological advances and new social 
problems surfaced. The increase in the longevity of the population became evident, with 
significant socio-demographic implications. As the aging of population became more 
and more prevalent, growing pressure was exerted on governments to provide support 
and assistance to this segment of the population (Brooks and Manza 2007). The logic of 
the industrialist approach identified public social provision as a “functional 
prerequisite” of industrial capitalist democracies, proclaiming it as a “path common to 
all societies undergoing a transition from agrarian to industrial capitalism” (Brooks and 
Manza 2007, 14).  
Differently to industrialist theory, the “radical” neo-Marxist approach posits the 
socio-political implications of capitalism, namely class antagonism and struggle, as the 
root cause of the emergence of welfare states. Put simply, welfare states rose out of the 
need of capitalist states to attain legitimacy and secure popular support. Social 
provisions provided by the welfare state were the concession that the capitalist elite had 
to make in order to ease the pressure from below and to ultimately prevent any major 
clash of classes (Brooks and Manza 2007). 
The “power resource” approach claims that welfare states were the consequence 
of growing working class influence on governments. Eventually, the working class 
managed to establish a social consciousness that became politically represented through 
left-wing parties. Countries with strong left-wing parties and impactful labor unions 
promoted the presence of working-class interests in the development of social policy, 
contrary to those with strong right-wing parties that mainly insisted on the liberalization 
of market through lesser state intervention (Aidukaite 2009; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Various studies have strongly supported this theory concerning the rise, variation and 
development of welfare states (Aidukaite 2009). For instance, regions dominated by 
left-wing parties and influential labor unions, such as the Scandinavian countries, 
generally register higher levels of spending on social protection programs that aim at 
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providing universal services and support, while countries whose governments are 
dominated by right-wing or center coalitions, such as in todays‟ East-Central European 
countries or the United Kingdom, display a higher propensity to implement limited and 
means-tested welfare state support only to targeted citizens, and to allocate lower levels 
of spending to welfare.  
Adding to, yet challenging the “power resources” approach, the “path 
dependency” approach claims that the variation and development of welfare states is 
engraved in an enduring history of social policies. While early developments of social 
policy channeled states into particular paths, according to the initial power conditions, 
any ensuing attempts to make substantial changes out of that institutionalized path is 
met by strong opposition (Brooks and Manza 2007).  Therefore, the variations of 
welfare state became to some extent “locked in” each society‟s historical experiences. 
The approach suggests that countries which have historically invested heavily in their 
welfare state, such as Sweden for instance, are resistant to later fundamental 
transformations in welfare state, regardless of external or internal pressures to do so 
(Park 2005).  
Deriving from neo-liberal ideology and policies, the phenomenon of 
globalization has also stressed its impact on welfare state. The “globalization” approach 
asserts that social policies in each country will inevitably converge to an ever more 
liberal welfare regime. The growing international mobility of capital puts mounting 
pressure on domestic governments to maintain national competitiveness and to steer 
their economic systems to become ever more market-oriented (Brooks and Manza 2007; 
Park 2005). Significantly increasing or failing to decrease welfare spending amounts to 
higher taxes on capital, labor and income, as well as to market interventions, creating an 
unfavorable environment for foreign direct investment. This weakens the countries‟ 
capability to cope with domestic spending and demands and with it the ability to ensure 
generous and universal social welfare policies; most welfare states as we know them 
would eventually disappear (Park 2005). 
Lastly, the “embedded preference” approach has recently attracted considerable 
attention. It provides a strong critique of globalization theories, dismissing the 
possibility of a linear convergence of welfare states into a liberal regime and their 
eventual disappearing due to globalization pressures. Simultaneously, it grants 
contextual support to two other models by explaining how “power resource” and “path 
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dependency” theories developed in the first place. Both imply particular policy 
preferences of the aggregate public opinion. However, both their theoretical frameworks 
began without prior questioning what caused a given political configuration in the 
power resources approach, and specific historical developments of social policies in the 
path dependency approach. The “embedded preference” approach points out three 
causal factors to explain the variations of particular preferences concerning the welfare 
state; citizens policy attitude based on social-structural location, relevance of the role of 
major institutions such as religious organizations, families, unions, political parties and 
schools, and collective memories. The two former factors are central to a sociological 
model of both political behavior and preferences. Citizens‟ social location limits the 
aggregate policy preferences due to strong surrounding social factors, while a regular 
exposure to major social institutions affects their collective identity contributing to the 
prevalence of a particular public policy preference. The third factor entails the 
significant relevance of past experiences from specific events, policies or institutions. 
Hence, collective memories from past interactions shape the citizens‟ aggregate policy 
preferences. As such, it explains generous and universal welfare state in social 
democracies as a citizens‟ preference for social provision, while limited and targeted 
welfare state in liberal democracies as a result of greater preference for private 
alternatives (Brooks and Manza 2007). 
Regardless of their major contributions, each of the above approaches faces 
criticism. While the radical approach fails to cohere to the contemporary developments 
of the welfare state, industrialist-related theories do not manage to explain a lot the 
variations of welfare state development past the mere necessity of modern states to 
provide social provisions for aging populations. Power resources theories fail to take 
into account external pressure from international institutions such as the EU, IMF and 
World Bank on domestic welfare configuration (Deacon 2000), especially on post-
socialist countries. Moreover, power resources theory seems to ignore the fact that the 
political constellation in many post-socialist countries is rather fragmented and not as 
well set in as in the established party systems in western capitalist countries (Aidukaite 
2009). Path dependency theories have proved incapable of providing a fitting 
explanation to welfare state variations emerging out of post-socialist countries, which 
mostly embraced a fundamental transition to a liberal welfare state model, or explain 
Great Britain‟s fundamental transition from social democratic to liberal model in the 
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1970s. Meanwhile, claims by the globalization approach for an inevitable disintegration 
of welfare state seem quite premature, in the light of vast evidence showing almost no 
decline or breakup of welfare states since the 1980s despite increasing pressure by 
globalization (Park 2005). In addition, globalization theories minimize down to 
extinction the consideration of domestic politics associated with decision-making 
processes about welfare state policies. Lastly, the embedded preference approach, much 
like path dependency, fails to give enough credit to the influence of international 
institutions on vulnerable transition countries.  
Welfare state regime types 
Besides the discussion on the origin and variations of welfare state in the first 
place, clustering such variations into conceptual types is a major field of interest in the 
research on welfare states. Several types of welfare states attempting to classify and 
label specific regimes, such as Esping-Andersen‟s, are established as pioneering 
contributions while others are often a critical response to the shortcomings of such 
clusters, or represent complementary additions to them.  
Esping-Andersen (1990), deriving from Titmuss‟ (1958) well established 
trichotomy of residual, industrial achievement, and institutional welfare states, 
distinguishes three types of welfare state regimes based on the level of 
decommodification and the kind of social stratification it produced. The former refers to 
the extent to which “a service is rendered as a matter of right, and (...) a person can 
maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market”, whereas the latter indicates the 
level of the intensity and range of redistribution of resources and services (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 21-22). Based on these core features, he identified liberal, conservative-
corporatist and social democratic welfare states. 
The liberal type of welfare state is characterized by low decommodification, 
limited and means-tested support, privatized pension funds, and modest social insurance 
programs, embodying individualism and a primacy of the market. Thus, governmental 
budget allocation dedicated to social protection spending is rather low and limited. Its 
beneficiaries are mainly low-income, below poverty line, state dependent citizens. 
Liberal welfare states are mainly found in the United States, Canada, Australia, as well 
as the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe (Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
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The conservative-corporatist type, on the other hand, entails a moderate degree 
of state support, limited to low income benefits, and pension support related to 
professional and occupational status. Given its catholic influence and legacy, the 
conservative-corporatist model endeavors to preserve traditional family structures, by 
discouraging women to participate in the labor market, and it follows the principle of 
subsidiarity, which means that the state will interfere once the family‟s capability to 
provide for its members is exhausted (Esping-Andersen 1990; Fenger 2007). This 
welfare state model prevailed mainly in Western Europe, including countries such as 
Italy, France, Germany, Finland and Switzerland (Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
Lastly, the social-democratic welfare type, making up the opposite pole to the 
liberal one, displays generous and universal social protection to all its citizens 
regardless of their contribution. Countries belonging in this type, namely Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and in particular Norway, Denmark and Sweden, are committed to 
a full employment strategy, for it is only viable to maintain this high level of welfare 
spending if as many citizens as possible are employed and are active contributors (Arts 
and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 1990). This classification of welfare state regimes 
has stood up for decades, as it still does, as the groundwork of welfare state typologies.  
Nevertheless, it has faced criticism. Friendly critics argue that Esping-
Andersen‟s work is “neither exhaustive nor exclusive and therefore needs revision” 
(Arts and Galissen 2007, 138), while others more fundamentally criticize his theoretical 
and methodological stances; the strongest critics assert that such typologies have no 
explanatory significance and therefore do not contribute to theorizing about the 
development of the welfare state (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Baldwin 1996). One crucial 
and common criticism of Esping-Andersen‟s scheme encountered in the literature is the 
failing to include „Southern‟ or „Mediterranean‟ countries in his scheme, as well as the 
recent incapability to adequately fit post-communist countries within the three-type 
model (Aidukaite 2011; Ferrera 1996; Ferrera 2005; Manning 2004). 
Leibfried (1992, cited by Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ferrera 1996) led the way of 
criticisms on the exclusion of “southern” European countries. Leibfried distinguishes 
four welfare state regimes, based on the different policy models with which welfare 
state institutions fulfill their role in combating poverty and inequality; the modern 
model (the Scandinavian welfare state), the institutional model („Bismarck‟ welfare 
state), the residual model (Anglo-Saxon welfare state), and the rudimentary model 
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(Latin Rim welfare state). Even though Leibfried takes into account different indicators 
to those Esping-Andersen employed when designing his typology, three out of the four 
Leibfried‟s types greatly converge with those in Esping-Andersen‟s original model. The 
fourth original type includes the countries that were left out or misplaced in Esping-
Andersen‟s typology, namely Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and France. According to 
him, the reason why these countries should belong to a distinct group of model is their 
poorly articulated social minimum and right to welfare (Ferrera 1996).  
Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) explicitly supported the inclusion of the 
“southern” type of welfare state, and not just as an underdeveloped subcategory of any 
another type (namely, Esping-Andersen‟s conservative type), but rather as a completely 
separate one (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Ferrera proposes a four-pronged welfare state 
typology, based on different dimensions to both Esping-Andersen‟s and Leibfried‟s; 
eligibility rules, requirements under which benefits are distributed, regulations of 
financials of social protection, and structural arrangements of social security schemes 
(Ferrera 1996). Despite those definitional differences, he comes up with an almost 
identical typology to Leibfriend‟s. Ferrera identifies the Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckain, 
Scandinavian, and Southern models. 
The distinguishing features found in Southern welfare states that produce the 
necessity for the introduction of a specific type are the absence of minimum social 
protection coupled with generous old age pensions, the provision of healthcare as a 
social right, and most importantly, high levels of clientelism in social security financing 
and the distribution of cash benefits (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Bonoli (1997) also 
proposed an addition of a southern European type, and was especially critical of Esping-
Andersen‟s decommodification approach. Alternatively, he based his scheme on social 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the percentage of social expenditure financed 
by contributions (Bonoli 1997). The main resulting difference in his four-type scheme 
was that Switzerland was included in the Southern model, together with Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal (Bonoli 1997, 361). 
Criticism of the exclusion of post-socialist countries from Esping-Andersen‟s 
typology only started to develop once the assumption that these countries would all 
follow a liberal welfare state model encountered evidential inconsistencies. The 
transition of post-socialist countries turned out to be more complex than expected, and 
several recent studies have shown that post-socialist welfare state policies cannot be 
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fitted into any of Esping-Andersen‟s types (Aidukaite 2011; Fenger 2007) and 
particularly not into a liberal regime (Aidukaite 2011; Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009). 
Fenger (2007) replicated Esping-Andersen‟s methodology substituting new available 
data for post-socialist countries, showing that the latter differ noticeably from the 
typology provided by Esping-Andersen. 
Based on these, some scholars have emphasized the developing differences 
among the newly transformed post-socialist countries with regard to their welfare state 
policies, advocating for distinguishing subgroups or subcategories within the existing 
typology, rather than classifying these developments into new and separate typology 
(Bohle 2007; Lendvai 2008), while others argued for a separate post-socialist type of 
welfare state based on significant historical and socio-economic similarities (Aidukaite 
2009; Aidukaite 2011; Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009, Fenger 2007). Such a model would 
share traits from both the liberal and conservative types, while incorporating specific 
features found in post-socialist societies. High coverage but low benefits levels, 
supremacy of the social insurance system, identification of wide-ranging social policies 
with the Soviet past, and low level of trust in state institutions are some common 
features attributed specifically to a post-socialist or Eastern European welfare system 
(Aidukaite 2011; Fenger 2007). Differences within the group are noticeable (Manning 
2004), but nevertheless less pronounced than between this group of countries and other 
Western welfare states.   
Yet other authors took a fiercer swing at typologies as a whole, going as far as to 
questioning their basic scientific significance. Kasha (2002) concludes that each country 
displays such a variety of welfare policies on pensions, social assistance, unemployment 
benefits, housing etc., as a response to historical developments, variations in the 
policymaking process, influence of foreign practices, and involvement of different 
policy actors (Fenger 2007), that the different overlappings of all these factors make the 
emergence of a coherent and distinct regime clusters impossible. Baldwin (1996), 
claimed that when studying variations we must concern ourselves with the question 
„why‟ just as much as „what‟; hence, he finds welfare state typologies, as for that matter 
all typologies, to have no explanatory significance and to contribute very little to 
theorizing of welfare states (Arts and Gelissen 2002).  
In response to criticism, Esping Andersen (1997) pointed out that his typology is 
made up of ideal types that are vulnerable to different historical pressures and develop 
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into qualitatively different trajectories; therefore, hybrid forms are empirically possible 
and may be developed as types (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Nevertheless, he believed that 
ideal types are completely relevant in that they enable one to “see forest rather than the 
myriad of unique trees” (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 139). Typologies are important to our 
study because they will guide us in seeking out a country‟s commitment to particular 
welfare state policies, as we will later on look at possible correlations between welfare 
state regimes and the informal economy.  
Welfare state transformations in post-socialist countries 
The major transformation experienced by post-socialist countries took place in 
the context of a critical economic and social juncture, with dramatic decline in income 
for most of the population, due to soaring inflation and record unemployment levels 
(Aidukaite 2010; Fenger 2007; Kornai 2006). Such circumstances created the urgent 
necessity for emergency welfare state programs, and the new government‟s legitimacy 
“to a large extent depended on their ability to provide adequate social policies in answer 
to these problems”, leading to the introduction of ad hoc unemployment, disability, 
sickness and early retirement programs (Fenger 2007, 14). This marked the first phase 
of changes in social policies.  
During a second phase, more articulated and elaborated decisions with regard to 
social policies took place. Firstly, unemployment benefits deemed as “unsustainable 
expenses” were cut off (Manning 2004). Secondly, newly established governments that 
aimed at fencing off all affiliations with Communism limited their political behavior to 
emulating West European governments (Kornai 2006). As a result, political 
representatives “were caught between preexisting commitments to provide for their 
populations, and intense pressures to restructure their economies, cut social 
expenditures, and adopt more market-conforming welfare models” (Cook 2007, 47). 
Esping-Andersen (1996) suggestively anticipated that the new welfare systems 
emerging in the post-socialist spaces would eventually converge to a liberal model. This 
did happen to a large extent, as transitional programs dependent on external aid called 
for the elimination of state monopolies over social provision, the privatization of 
healthcare and the reform of pensions schemes, and the replacement of universal social 
assistance with means-tested programs targeting only the poor (Cook 2007). However, 
this projection was contrasted by a more particularistic approach that sought to 
demonstrate that post-socialist states eventually followed non-conventional paths based 
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on their differing political constellations, constituencies‟ preferences, geographical 
positioning, economic stability, and vulnerability to international institutions and 
external political actors (Aidukaite 2010; Cook 2007; Manning 2004; Polese, Morris, 
and Kovacs  2014).  
The final phase witnessed a degree of economic stabilization in these countries, 
as several of them retrieved levels of economic production close to those they had 
enjoyed prior to the transition. A review of the developments in East-Central European 
countries with socialist pasts, namely Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, reported remarkable variation in social and 
economic performance, pension schemes, health care, unemployment programs, and 
social assistance practices, since the start of social policy reforms (Manning 2004). 
While Slovenia and the Czech Republic leaned towards a West European model – a mix 
of social-democratic and conservative-corporatist types, characterized by higher social 
spending, higher state involvement and decommodication –, most of the Visegrad 
countries (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) exhibited something in-between the liberal 
and the conservative-corporatist types, and the Baltic countries moved rather more 
towards a liberal model (Aidukaite 2009; Manning 2004). Other classifications of 
welfare states in post-socialist counties may be found in the literature (see Deacon 2000; 
EBRD 1999; UNDP 1999; World Bank 1996). 
These countries‟ paths towards a particular welfare state type or hybrid regimes 
is indicative of the practical application of some theoretical approaches to welfare state 
variations discussed in the second section of this chapter. The Baltic countries‟ adoption 
of liberal welfare state policies was greatly influenced by the negative economic 
performance determined by their soviet legacy (Aidukaite 2011). This made them be 
particularly in need of external help, which came in the form of loans and credits by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since these came attached to the IMF‟s neoliberal 
globalization agenda, this made a liberal welfare state regime a condition for eligibility 
(Manning 2004). Much the same could be said concerning Central-Eastern European 
countries, namely Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. In addition to economic 
vulnerability, it was cautiously suggested that the positive attitude of these countries in 
relation to globalization pressures was influenced by the countries‟ political endeavor to 
join Euro-Atlantic structures (Aidukaite 2009). 
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Unlike the preceding sets of countries, Slovenia and the Czech Republic bluntly 
rejected the neo-liberal agenda, especially with regard to privatizing pension funds. 
Both countries experienced more economic stability upon the transition to a market-
based economy, making them less dependent on external help. Moreover, in the case of 
Slovenia, key policy actors who rejected such proposals by the World Bank came from 
the Ministry of Labor, the trade unions, and the pensioners‟ lobby, displaying a power 
resource configuration, and a particular embedded preference for rejecting right-wing 
social policy tendencies (Manning 2004). Illustratively, the magnitude of the rejection 
of the privatization of pension schemes led to a government resignation in 2011 upon 
the result of a referendum.  Others have suggested that the reason why Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic were so comfortable with their transitional reforms in social policies 
was their geographical location (Aidukaite 2011; Cerami and Vanhuysee 2009). This 
argument suggests that countries located closer to the Western Europe border have 
experienced a faster and more successful transformation due to their strong economic 
and cultural ties with the West (Aidukaite 2011). However, no single theory can fully 
explain the dynamics of developments and changes in the post-socialist societies.  The 
welfare state developments in these regions were subject to the causal interplay of 
societal, economic, political, cultural, and historical aspects in each given country 
(Aidukaite 2009).  
Nowadays, despite remarkable changes in financial and economic growth, most 
post-socialist countries are still lagging behind the old capitalist democracies regarding 
economic and social parameters, with the possible exceptions of Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic. Several studies show that the post-socialist countries, most of them nowadays 
are new EU members, remain below the rest of EU members in terms of minimum 
wage, social protection expenditures, labor market policy, poverty, inequality and 
unemployment (Aidukaite 2011) 
Welfare programs in Kosovo 
Kosovo underwent the same severe social and economic transition that swept 
over the entire region of former socialist societies. However, even though many 
similarities of Kosovo‟s transition may be spotted in the familiar pattern across the 
regional context, closer attention must be paid to her specific socio-historical and 
political circumstances, in order to understand the uniqueness of that transition. To 
begin with, Kosovo is the most blatant case of external influence in domestic policy-
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making, exerting itself on a disintegrated political configuration. Its post-conflict 
legacy, devastated economy, social disintegration, and massive international presence 
upon the military intervention in 1999 made Kosovo especially vulnerable to 
international influence coming in the shape of aid, loans, and credits.  
Kosovo made a transition from a generous and universal welfare system that 
was in place in the Socialist Federal State of Yugoslavia, to a neoliberal welfare state in 
the wake of eventful political developments. The former Socialist Federal state of 
Yugoslavia had a very generous welfare system, comprising social insurance and social 
protection. The former covered pension funds, social insurance in case of temporary 
unemployment, and health insurance, whereas the latter was more focused on the most 
vulnerable social strata, who could profit from goods and services provided by 
companies and local municipalities (Stamboliva 2012). Following the end of the war in 
1999 and the resulting institutional void, Kosovo adopted what became known as an 
“emergency welfare program” (Inglot 2008). This was designed as a product of 
international intervention and took very little consideration of the socio-historical 
characteristics of Kosovo. Interestingly, what was initially designed an emergency 
welfare program went on to become the “normal” institutional blueprint, as today‟s 
Kosovo has built its welfare system on that legacy of neoliberalism, residualism and 
selectivity (Stamboliva 2012). 
Kosovo‟s current social welfare programs had their origin in the massive 
humanitarian assistance delivered in the summer of 1999 upon the intervention of the 
international community. The process that became known as the “social welfare 
transition” was a multifaceted transformation of the humanitarian assistance network, 
the two major carriers of which were the World Food Programme (WTP) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Cocozzelli 2009). As 
the result of a devastating war, many families had been left without a family guardian or 
breadwinner, over 1200 children had lost both parents, many former employees of over 
200 state-owned enterprises were left with no jobs and no regular financial incomes. 
The number of families receiving regular salaries from their occupation and/or from 
private business concerns decreased, while the number of families living off 
humanitarian aid and remittances increased tenfold. The unemployment rate was 
estimated at around 74%, immediately after the war, dropped to 45-55% within a couple 
of years (Riinvest 2001). 
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Eventually, as the international emergency aid program came to an end, there 
was the need to transform the NGO-supported humanitarian assistance system into a 
well-established state-based welfare program (Cocozelli 2009). On the verge of the 
emerging social policies and welfare state programs, Kosovo was under complete 
administration from a western-based International Body with executive powers. The 
model of welfare programs which were to be implemented during the reconstruction 
period inevitably carried the stamp of neo-liberal features and principles. Regardless of 
initial claims registered in the European Commission and the World Bank report (1999) 
that that Kosovars should be closely involved in designing and implementing the 
reconstruction and recovery programs, little of the locals‟ outputs or insight were taken 
into effective consideration. The newly proposed social policies were driven by the 
economic ideology of neo-liberalism as a panacea for all post-conflict societies (Pugh 
2014). 
The reformed welfare state system had three particular schemes, namely, social 
assistance, war victims‟ benefits, and pension schemes; all of which were premised on 
individualist interpretation of social rights, and featured modest benefits that could 
guarantee only the bare minimum personal expenses (Cocozelli 2009).  
The Social Assistance Scheme remained effectively the same once the administered 
province of Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, with minor changes in 
application criteria and the maximum size of beneficiary families. Differently to social 
assistance, the need for changes in the pension system was widely recognized. Two 
years after the end conflict, in 2001 the international leadership initiated a pension 
policy design intended to be sustainable in the long term. This initiative was funded by 
USAID and led by representatives of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID) (IKS 2016c). 
Prior to the upcoming new pension model, Kosovo had been covered by the 
Yugoslav pension system, which was an intergenerational solidarity “pay-as-you-go” 
system, through which active workers paid contributions to fund the benefits of current 
pensioners. The Province of Kosovo had its own autonomous pension fund which was 
responsible for collecting contributions and providing benefits, but that was only up 
until the revocation of the autonomy status by the Yugoslav authorities in March 1989 
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(Group for Legal and Political Studies 2012). Albanians who were then active in the 
labor market had paid their contributions to an authority which would never return 
pension benefits to them. The new pension system knowingly excluded a generation of 
past contributors from their future social and legal right to collect pension benefits.  
The new Pension Scheme, as currently in force, is a three-pillared system. The first 
pillar provides basic pension coverage to all senior residents over 65 years of age, with a 
sui-generis residence requirement only, unlike any other system in the region, and it is 
fully funded by the general revenues of the central government budget. Irrespective of 
past contributions, all retirees were put in the same category, which practically can be 
considered a social assistance benefit to prevent elderly poverty, rather than a pension.  
In addition to the first pillar, a particular scheme for Disability Pension and Early 
Pensions for the employees of TREPCA mines was introduced in 2004.
2
 Both 
subcategories could also be considered practically as social assistance benefits, rather 
than pensions. The monthly values ranged from 50-70 EUR, and 40-45 EUR 
respectively (IKS 2016b).   
The second pillar is based on personal contributions, which are mandatory for all the 
employees in form of a 10% tax on the gross wage, paid by the employee and the 
employer, 5% each. This scheme is managed by the Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust 
(KPST), an independent institution licensed and supervised by the Central Bank of 
Kosovo (CBK), while contributions are collected by the Tax Administration of Kosovo 
(TAK) (IKS 2016b). 
The third pension pillar enables the establishment of supplementary pension funds 
contracted with private insurance companies, either by the employers for their 
employees, by the employees themselves as additional insurance, or both.  This pillar is 
barely used (IKS 2016c).    
Throughout the time when Kosovo was under the international supervision, between 
1999 and 2008, the only active pension program was the first pillar, known as Basic 
Pension. It initially budgeted in July 2002 at €28 per month for every eligible senior 
citizen, and was mainly based on the value of minimum-calorie Food Basket of 2,100 
calories per day per adult (Cocozelli 2009; IKS 2016b). From 2004 to 2008, the 
                                                          
2
 A large industrial complex located in the north of Kosovo, which had been one of the largest enterprises 
in former Yugoslavia.  
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monthly pension was gradually increased from €28 to €40. The number of beneficiaries 
also increased every year. The Kosovo Basic Pension compared unfavorably to pension 
programs in the region in terms of the level of benefits in relation to the average annual 
wage. It also compared unfavorably to the level of the former pension benefits under the 
Federal Socialist State of Yugoslavia.  
As to this day, Kosovo employs a model of pension programs according to the 
principles of a design determined in the 2001-2003 period (see table 1). Modifications, 
improvements and extensions have continually been made since the independence in 
2008, but none of those challenged or questioned the determination to move from a 
solidarity system to a contribution-based system. Little consideration was taken of the 
fact that this substantial transition left a full generation of contributors under the 
Yugoslav pension scheme with only a basic pension originally budgeted at only €28 per 
month. 
It certainly was very challenging to develop a new system of pensions that 
would ease the transition and be acceptable and attractive to both the current and past 
contributors, sustainable in terms of fiscal stability and economic growth, and 
promoting a labor market in a society overwhelmed by a fundamental transformation of 
political, societal, economical system (Group for Legal and Political Studies 2012). 
Where does this pension system stand today? 
 
Table 1. Basic features of Kosovar old-age and disability pension schemes (IKS 2016b) 
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Nowadays, pension schemes are subject of strong criticism for excluding various 
groups such as rural residents, farmers, self-employed, and those who did not manage to 
contribute sufficiently to their pension funds due to the high levels of active informality, 
unemployment, job uncertainty, the low level of fiscal compliance, and the low wages 
practiced in the country. Kosovo has the smallest contribution rate in the region, 
suggesting that it is unrealistic to expect that most individuals will succeed in 
accumulating sufficient funds for a retirement pension (Group for Legal and Political 
Studies 2012). Even if we assume that all the registered contributors pay their 
contributions regularly, taking into account the current average wage (€340) and 
KPST‟s investment policy and performance so far, those contributors cannot expect a 
satisfactory pension upon their retirement. 
Things seem even worse for those who are to retire in the near future, since the 
accumulated contributions to their pensions fund will be insufficient to generate a 
sustainable pension for their years in retirement (Group for Legal and Political Studies 
2012). Strong criticism has also been addressed to the contributory pension scheme for 
its vulnerability to political influence and potential mismanagement of the funds (as 
noted in Kosova Sot 2016), as well as inadequate and ineffective mechanisms to insure 
a regular collection of pension contributions. Most importantly, today‟s pension 
program benefits are largely unsatisfactory for all categories of beneficiaries, as they 
fail to meet the minimum monthly consumptions of goods, leaving the pensioners in a 
miserable socio-economic state of elderly poverty (Group for Legal and Political 
Studies 2012). 
On a more positive note, despite the poor financial and functional support that 
these social schemes provide, up to now they seem to be contributing to maintain some 
degree of social peace. According to figures dating back to some ten years ago, if the 
available social transfers were to be stopped, the poverty rate would have risen by 12%. 
Basic pension transfers also seem to have a considerable influence in tackling poverty; 
if they were to be withdrawn, the poverty rate would have risen by 9% (Murati and 
Berisha 2010). The remaining social benefits seem to have a very modest effect, and 
those who are entitled to them most likely remain below the poverty line. Given that all 
pension and social assistance schemes are funded either by the general revenues of the 
central government budget and/or by mandatory individual contributions, both strongly 
depend on the state‟s ability to enforce taxes on registered economic activities as well as 
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to provide the incentives to comply with the formal economy and the related 
contributory responsibilities. This poses the crossing point between the practices of 
informality, low compliance rate, and the effectiveness of welfare programs, and paves 
the way for our next step into the discussion. 
3. The informal economy and welfare state policies 
The informal economy and welfare state policies may be seen as interdependent, 
to the extent that they both depend on the state‟s capability to make its presence 
effective, and that this interacts with their respective incentives and resources. The 
former is indicative of the state‟s failure to enforce the registration and compliance of 
economic activities, including employment relations, to formal rules, because of its 
incapacity both to track and trace these activities and to provide incentives for economic 
subjects to comply with their formal economic responsibilities. The latter depends on 
the state‟s ability to fund welfare state programs, providing social protection schemes 
that may work as incentives for compliance – the lack of which can in turn result of the 
state‟s fiscal inability, due to economic informality. 
Inadequate social protection schemes and the inability to provide compliance 
incentives with formal rules both break social trust in formal institutions. As a result, 
noncompliant behavior becomes increasingly popular, while the effectiveness of actual 
social protection schemes becomes hindered. Therefore, the further development of an 
informal sector depends on the state‟s (in)ability and (un)willingness to develop labour 
market policies that create incentives to formalization (Heinze and Olk 1982), while the 
type, size and effectiveness of these policy schemes is in turn negatively influenced by 
the spread of informal economic practices (Aidukaite 2010; Aidukaite 2011).  
Labor market policies – which include government intervention targeted at 
groups with difficulties in the labor market, training, employment incentives, startup 
incentives, unemployment benefits, early retirement, and social security schemes – must 
be dealt with carefully. Practices of welfare state have been viewed as a risk to human 
capital and economic development, because of their exposure to cheating and moral 
hazard (Perkins 2016).  One example of this kind is the welfare system provision of „the 
right to guaranteed income‟ which was in place in the United States before 1996. It 
provided single-parent families with benefits for as long as remained eligible; these 
benefits were in a sum of US$ 13,000 of which US$ 7,500 in cash while the rest was 
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earmarked to housing allowance, medical care, and other non-cash benefits (Pejovich 
1999). Soon enough, the right to guaranteed income encountered abuse by its recipients 
since they “had the incentives to pursue activities that would allow them to remain on 
welfare indefinitely, such as remaining a single parent, not looking for employment, 
disinvesting in human capital, and seeking covert work”, and it even created incentives 
for other citizens to become single parents (Pejovich 1999, 168). 
Another example of moral hazard in welfare policies is the case of preference of 
disability over unemployment benefits. For some time now, welfare programs of the 
kind of disability benefits in Europe have been prone to mismanagement and abuse by 
people without actual health incapacities, who used disability benefits as an alternative 
income support upon ineligibility to unemployment benefits, or/and as a pathway to 
early retirement (Marie and Castello 2011). In the Netherlands during the 1990s, as 
disability benefits were higher than unemployment benefits, this stirred up an 
overpopulation of disability schemes, with estimates suggesting that as much as half of 
their recipients were in fact hidden unemployed (de Mooij 1999). He advocated that 
reducing welfare benefits for the unemployed reduces the social security premium for 
the working population, and it exerts pressure on inactive potential breadwinners.  
Lower income replacement rates induce the search intensity of the unemployed, as well 
as their likelihood of accepting a job offer (de Mooij 1990). Thus, he estimated that 
employment would increase by 1.5%, and effective unemployment would drop by 0.8% 
if unemployment benefits were cut by 5% while disability benefits remained unaffected. 
Similarly, a reduction in disability benefits by 5%, while maintaining unemployment 
benefits unaffected, would reduce unemployment by 0.7%. Since lower unemployment 
benefits increase hidden unemployment and recipients of disability benefits are not 
exposed to any pressure by the government to do job hunting, he concluded that a 
decrease in the welfare benefit for the disabled is “an effective policy in reducing total 
unemployment and, in particular, hidden unemployment” (de Mooij 1999, 712). 
Marie and Castello (2011) concur that disability benefits reduce labor force 
participation. They looked at Spain‟s disability pensions and analyzed for employment 
effects of an increase in the benefits of disability pensions. Their results show a negative 
causal relationship. All individual characteristics of recipients aside, they estimated that 
had not the benefits generosity increased by 36% “the employment of disability 
insurance (DI) recipients would have been 8% higher” (Marie and Castello 2012, 209). 
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Overall, these studies indicate that while welfare expenditures often may be helpful in 
reducing poverty, they have no positive return on the economy as they fail to 
successfully accommodate their recipients into the labor market, and they tend to create 
long-term dependency (Ahmend and Miller 2000, cited in McDonald and Miller 2010; 
Lichter and Jayakory 2002), as recent contributions have argued that welfare state 
benefits are influencing the “development trajectory of the personality profile of the 
population towards greater employment-resistance” and “have been followed by a 
substantial decrease in work motivation” among the nations of the Western world 
(Perkins 2016, 6).  
Supporters of welfare state argue otherwise. Anthony King (1983) argued that in 
the absence of welfare provision “it is very doubtful whether the seemingly inevitable 
economic and social vicissitudes of the latter part of the twentieth century would be 
easily borne by increasingly well-informed, well-read, well-travelled, potentially restive 
urban population” (King 1983, 22). In that same line of argument, Wilensky (1983) 
expressed criticism of economists‟ dealing with welfare policies as shortsighted, for not 
taking into account welfare policies‟ impact on social consensus. He also questioned the 
claim that welfare state provision and expenditure impact negatively the economic 
performance. In fact, ever since after World War II the “heavy spending corporatist 
democracies have done as well or better than the welfare state laggards”, by any 
measure of economic performance (Wilensky 1983, 56). That includes the heavy 
spenders such Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Norway, which have 
consistently performed better in annual growth, inflation and unemployment as 
compared to the rest of rich democracies between 1950 and 1974 (Wilensky 1983).  
Recent studies with regards to the effect of welfare policies on economic 
development claim that an increase in expenditure in these policies may directly provide 
jobs, and also affects employment levels via job training and educational opportunities, 
supplying the job market with higher levels of education and professional skills 
(McDonald and Miller 2010; Wolfe 2002). In addition, welfare programs have the 
capacity to “increase employment levels during specific market inefficiencies by 
providing training to recipients for key industries, such as technological and medical 
related fields” (McDonald and Miller 2010, 721). Welfare may foster employment 
indirectly as well, through sponsoring organizations and industries that produce 
government-related goods and services (Devereux, Head, and Lapham 2000; Jones 
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1990; McDonald and Miller 2010, 721). Basically, welfare state programs project social 
protection mechanisms as a return investment strategy, through which recipients 
experience a raise in human capital allowing them to invest in economic activities 
(McDonald and Miller 2010). 
As a result, some scholars contend that generous welfare state programs actually 
promote economic growth by creating a flow of capital, which eventually will lead to a 
return of recipients to the workforce, allowing them to collect and spend capital, and 
partake in fiscal responsibilities (McDonald and Miller 2010; Ploug 2005; Wolfe 2002). 
McDonald and Miller‟s (2010) empirical analysis focused on testing three particular 
models: employment, investments and direct economic growth. The first model 
(employment) revealed that “welfare expenditures aggravate unemployment in the short 
term, but reduce unemployment a year later”, suggesting that while welfare state 
programs may at first encourage free-riding amongst recipients, they do have a positive 
effect in returning them to workforce later on (McDonald and Miller 2010, 728). 
Secondly, their findings show that welfare state expenditures tend to hinder investments 
both in the short and the long term, meaning that funds allocated to welfare state 
programs might potentially have been allocated elsewhere with higher return to 
investment. And lastly, their estimates showed welfare state expenditure to have no 
significant correlation with economic growth. Nevertheless, as noted by the authors, the 
lack of direct effect on economic growth does not exclude a potential indirect effect, 
through the channel of employment. The confirmed positive effect of welfare state on 
employment suggests an indirect positive effect on the economy. 
More to our main point, welfare state benefits may also be effective in fighting 
informality. Heinze and Olk (1982, 197) believed that the relationship between the 
formal and informal sectors depends “entirely on what sort of economic, social, and 
unemployment policies are pursued”. Policies leading to improvement in employment 
and welfare may minimize the operation space of the informal economy and stigmatize 
informal economic behaviors. Bosch and Esteban-Pretel‟s (2015) and Fugazza and 
Jasques‟s (2003) works address this matter. 
The former discuss unemployment benefits in economies with high informality 
and their impact in the labor market. In particular they looked at the effects of 
introducing unemployment benefits in middle-income countries such as Mexico. Bosch 
and Esteban-Pretel (2015) point at the large portion of workers, ranging up to 75%, who 
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are not entitled to unemployment benefits in developing countries. Workers who are 
more likely exposed to job insecurity largely work in the informal sector. Attracting 
workers into the formal sector and sustaining their job security may be achieved by 
introducing unemployment benefits. However, the effect of such policy can only be as 
successful as the tradeoff between the incentives provided to exit the informal sector 
and get a formal job, and the incentives to become eligible for unemployment benefits 
and move back into informal sector right away. In a country with high informal 
economy, such inflow and mobility is hardly resistible. 
In order for any unemployment benefit policy to be effective, Bosch and 
Esteban-Pretel (2015) urge the attention towards the interplay between contributions 
and replacement rates, and the importance of monitoring mechanism that must go along, 
given the evidence of abuse threatening these policies. Hence, higher benefits in ration 
to contributions make formal employment more attractive in comparison to informal 
employment, because such benefits are accessible only to formal jobs. But if higher 
contribution rates in ratio to the replacement rates or benefits are to be imposed, this 
may decrease the value of formal employment and increase the incentives of individuals 
to operate informally since no taxes are being paid and they can continue to collect 
unemployment benefits for some times. The institutional quality in the monitoring 
process is of significant relevance, an increase of which lowers the value of occupying 
an informal job and provides the positive effect to the mobility from informality to 
formality (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 2015). Failure to balance the incentives could 
downplay the relevance of welfare provisions in the fight against informality. In the 
case of Brazil, which is characterized by a large informal sector of nearly 50%, Ulyssea 
(2010) dismissed increasing unemployment benefits as an effective policy to decrease 
informality and improve labor market performance, because that would afford little 
incentives to exit unemployment and informality.  
Fugazza and Jasques (2003) provide empirical support to the negative 
relationship between the investment on labor market policies and informality. 
According to their conclusions, raising the generosity of unemployment benefits seems 
to have desirable equilibrium properties, even if monitoring practices are not found to 
be fully efficient. Any decision to decrease unemployment benefits for the sake of 
increasing formal sector would result counter-effective. Based on these results, they 
urged policy makers to opt for positive approach raising the incentives for citizens to 
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transit and stay in the regular sector through an increase in unemployment benefits, 
instead of a traditional deterrent approach aiming at decreasing the motivation of 
citizens to operate in the informal sector through fines and punishments. 
Adding to the above, Williams and Renooy (2013), in a study that included 27 
European Member States plus Norway, found significant negative correlation between 
the levels of undeclared economy and social protection expenditures, social protection 
effectiveness, and labor market policy expenditures (see figures 5, 6, 7).  However, they 
are careful to state that the correlation should be treated with caution because even 
though they suggest that a relationship exists, their results cannot prove a cause-effect 
relationship.  
 
Figure 5. The relation between social protection expenditure and informal economy in 
the EU27 and Norway (Williams and Renooy 2013, 27) 
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Figure 6. The relation between social protection effectiveness and informal economy in 
EU27 and Norway (Williams and Renooy 2013, 28 
 
Figure 7. The relation between labour market policies and informal economy in the 
EU27 and Norway (Williams and Renooy 2013, 26) 
Several studies have shown that countries with lower GDP and higher socio-
economic inequalities generally suffer more from informal economy (Aidukaite 2011, 
Williams and Renooy 2013). As we have discussed, these characteristics are indicative 
of low economic development, poor institutional quality and, suggestively, of impotent 
welfare state schemes. In the European context, these countries, usually situated in 
Central and South Eastern Europe, share a former socialist past. The informal economy 
is on average much higher in these countries (over 25%), as compared to the North-
West European countries (around 11%) (Williams and Renooy 2013). A few exceptions 
are evident within the post-socialist countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. These countries are doing better in terms of minimum wage, as 
well as social protection expenditures, due to economic stability and their governments‟ 
better ability to collect taxes and support social protection funds (Aidukative 2011). The 
same cannot be said for the remaining post-socialist countries, namely Romania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Baltic States, and Kosovo, which have the highest informal 
economy rates in Europe. As such, it may be argued that many citizens in these 
countries shirk paying taxes as response to the governments‟ failure to provide adequate 
support in cases of social risks, leaving them dependent on the market and the family as 
“the two most important agents for guaranteeing an adequate standard of living” 
(Aidukatite 2009, 35; Aidukaite 2010). 
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Expectedly, countries with large informal sectors are less likely to allocate 
expenditure to welfare state programs, and vice versa, for the reasons already discussed 
throughout the literature review. Besides, a large informal sector in a given country is of 
itself indicative of lack of rule of law, poor enforcing and monitoring mechanisms, high 
corruption and low public trust towards institutions, all of which discourage compliance 
behavior. Insofar, as these qualities preserver, welfare state programs are exposed to 
abuse and moral hazards, and their effectiveness against unemployment and informality 
is rather poor and at times counter-effective. 
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CHAPTER II: HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
We employed a sequential mixed method research design (Creswell 2012). One 
reason for choosing this kind of design was that when we commenced our data 
collection process, we had only the overall research problem and preliminary 
hypotheses drawn from the literature review to guide us. As applied in this research, the 
core purpose of the mixed methods approach included the gathering and analysis of 
qualitative data for exploratory purposes, furthering those preliminary guidelines into an 
explanatory analytical model. Quantitative data collection and analyses then followed, 
in order to test the resulting hypotheses. 
Since studies about Kosovo that address both terms of the relationship assumed 
in the research problem are scarce – a few are already published with regard to either 
the informal economy or welfare state programs in Kosovo, but to the best of our 
knowledge none have explicitly addressed the possible correlation between the two –, 
we decided to begin research with collecting and analyzing qualitative data. We did 
field research from January to March 2017 in Prishtina, capital city of Kosovo. During 
this period, besides collecting and reading documental sources that provided the 
historical, political and legal framework for our subjects, we conducted eight semi-
structured interviews with public officials and professionals, who were then or had 
previously been engaged in selected institutions, agencies, and workgroups in some way 
related to our subject matters. The selection of participants was based on their previous 
and actual contributions to, and likely first-hand knowledge of, the issues relevant to the 
study. The participants‟ consent was obtained after they had been fully informed of the 
purpose of the study and of the intended uses for the interview materials. None of them 
requested that they remain anonymous, and all consented for their interview to be voice-
recorded and cited in this dissertation. Each interview lasted between 30 and 45 
minutes. The list of the interviewees is as follows: 
Agron Demi, former Executive Director and current Policy Analyst at GAP 
Institute; Mr. Demi has previously been engaged in the Parliamentary 
Committees on Health, Labor and Social Welfare, and on Budget and Finance at 
the Assembly of Kosovo, as a legislative assistant; 
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Arbresha Loxha, Researcher at the Group for Legal and Political Studies; Ms. 
Loxha authored the 2012 Policy Report on „The Pension System in Kosovo‟, and 
her research focus is on Financial Economics and Welfare Policies; 
Arment Merovci, Head of the national strategy for preventing and fighting the 
informal economy, money-laundering, financing terrorism, and financial crimes, 
at the Ministry of Finance; 
Jeton Demi, Senior Official for Public Relations at the Kosovo Pension Savings 
Fund (TRUSTi); 
Jusuf Azemi, President of the Trade Unions of Kosovo; 
Lumnije Hashani, Senior Official for Legislation on Economic Matters at the 
Kosovo Chamber of Commerce; 
Safet Krasniqi, Head of the Tax Investigation Unit at the Tax Administration of 
Kosovo (TAK); 
Valon Leci, Director of the Department of Finances and General Services, Labor 
Inspection Agency at the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. 
Unfortunately, in spite of repeated attempts, we were not able to interview any 
official or expert of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare concerned with the types 
and effectiveness of welfare state programs. Nevertheless, the Department for Public 
Relations did make available to us via e-mail precious details about specific welfare 
programs and the prerequisites to become a beneficiary, along with quantitative data on 
the annual expenditure for each program. 
When contacted, each participant was duly informed about the purpose of the 
research and the research question, and was provided with the reasons for their selection 
and what is expected of them. Given the introduction to the guidelines of our research, 
the participants were prepared prior to our encounter. Agron Demi and Arberesha 
Loxha, from the civil society, provided us insights on both informal economy and 
welfare state system. Similar questions were asked to both of them that included initial 
broad questions on the state, practices and reasons of informal economy in Kosovo, the 
business environment, the evolution and evaluation of the current pension system and 
social assistance programs, and the role of the government in the matter. Sub-questions 
that targeted the assumed relation between informal economy and welfare state 
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programs followed, either through presenting our theoretical guidelines and asking for 
their professional and/or scientifically based inputs, or derived from the interviewees‟ 
initial development on the broader questions. 
Arment Merovci, as the representative from the Ministry of Finance in our 
study, was mainly asked about the role and the success of the national strategy for 
preventing and fighting informal economy, his evaluation of the nature and practices of 
informal economy commonly in Kosovo, as well as the role of public trust in state 
institutions‟ ability to enforce compliance behavior on citizens and businesses. Similar 
topics were discussed with Safet Krasniqi, with the particular interest on the mission 
and performance of tax investigation unit at the Tax Administration of Kosovo.  Jeton 
Demi was asked specifically about the state of pension funds in Kosovo, obstacles and 
challenges recognized by the institution, and how sustainable is the current pension 
model. The purpose of this interview with Demi was to obtain firsthand information on 
the contributory pension system in Kosovo. Jusuf Azemi, president of the trade unions 
in Kosovo, provided us with information about the terms and conditions of labor force 
in the private sector. That included the issue of widespread informality in the private 
sector, how much is the labor law obeyed by private business, and how does the 
contributory pension system reflect on the capacity of institutions to ensure participation 
of businesses and workers. In that line of contribution was also the interview with Valon 
Leci, representative from the Labour Inspection Agency. He was asked about the 
performance of the agency in tackling the informal economy by enforcing the law on 
labor, and the challenges that this agency faces due to the low number of human 
resources and labor inspectors. Lastly, Lumnije Hashani was asked about the business 
environment in Kosovo, economic informality, rule of law, and particular challenges 
and burdens that private businesses face on regular basis.  
Upon completion of the field research, we transcribed the interviews. The 
outcomes will be used below in chapter IV. Besides descriptive information which is 
useful in its own right, these have contributed decisively to unravel the research 
problem into a set of related hypotheses in a context-sensitive way, also leading to 
further a more targeted review of the theoretical literature. The hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Inefficient welfare state programs and a high level of informal economy 
reciprocally contribute to, and reinforce each other. 
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Hypothesis 1(a): Poorly funded and managed welfare programs contribute to 
higher levels of the informal economy. 
Hypothesis 1(b): Poorly funded and managed welfare programs contribute to 
lower citizens‟ trust in public institutions and perception of government quality. 
Hypothesis 1(c): High levels of informal economy hinder the size and 
effectiveness of welfare state programs, which in turn contributes to sustaining 
the relationships stated in hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b).  
Hypothesis 2: Social capital contributes to the levels of informal economy. 
Hypothesis 2(a): Trust among citizens contributes to lower levels of informal 
economy. 
Hypothesis 2(b): Shared civic norms against undeclared economic practices and 
free-riding practices contribute to lower levels of informal economy. 
Hypothesis 2(c): Citizens‟ engagement in associational activities (horizontal 
networking) contributes to lower levels of informal economy. 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, the 
greater is the propensity to participate in the informal economy. 
Hypothesis 3(a): Citizens‟ distrust towards public institutions contributes to 
higher levels of informal economy. 
Hypothesis 3(b): Citizens‟ perception of governance quality contributes to 
lower levels of informal economy. 
At this point, we have reached the second stage of sequential mixed methods 
design, by using a quantitative correlational method to assess our hypotheses and the 
analytical model as a whole. A quantitative correlational design implies the use of 
statistical tests to assess whether and to what extent two or more variables behave 
concomitantly, as required by the hypothetical statement that one of them affects the 
other, or that they affect each other (Creswell 2012).   
These hypotheses were tested using 31 indicators, listed in the summary table 
below. The table displays the name, brief description, methods used to extract, source 
and unit of measurement of each indicator. The indicators concern 29 European 
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countries, including Kosovo, for the year 2013.
3
 The year of 2013 is last time there was 
a proper study that measured the informal economy in Kosovo. Given that the level of 
informal economy is a key variable in our study, we were limited to that year.  On the 
other hand, our decision to include all these countries in our test was based, besides a 
general comparative interest, on the absence of longitudinal data allowing to conduct 
statistical tests for Kosovo alone. Therefore, our design strategy was to build up a multi-
country database so that we can first run cross-sectional correlation tests, and then 
discuss the results comparatively by zooming in on the position that Kosovo occupies in 
relation to other countries. 
The selection and construction of indicators were inspired by, or indeed 
collected out of the literature review. Indicators 2 to 5 in the summary table were taken 
from Williams, Kedir and Nadin (2013), which originally inspired us to follow up on 
their statement of a relationship between the informal economy and welfare state 
systems. We borrowed and replicated their operational definitions to retrieve the data on 
Kosovo and added this to the dataset.  
 
Variable Description 
Operational definition and 
Sources 
Unit of Measurement 
(1) Informal Economy 
Measure of undeclared 
economy practices 
Calculation of the size of 
informal economy was done 
with Multiple Indicators and 
Multiple Courses (MIMIC)4 
estimation procedure. 
(Schneider 2015)/ For the case 
of Kosovo the calculation of 
the size was done with 
interviews with private 
business managers (Riinvest 
2013) 
% of GDP 
(2) Social Protection 
Expenditure 
Measure of states‟ social 
protection expenditure as part 
of their welfare state systems 
Encompasses all interventions 
from public to private bodies 
intended to relieve households 
and individuals of the burden 
% of GDP 
                                                          
3 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
4 Refer to Schneider (2011) and Schneider and Williams (2013) for detailed explanation. 
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of defined risk or need. It 
includes expenditures for the 
following services: 
Sickness/Heath care, 
Disability, Old Age, 
Survivors, Family/Children, 
Unemployment, housing and 
Social exclusion5 (Eurostat; 
Ministry of Finance 2013) 
(3) Social Protection  
Expenditure (excl. Old Age 
pension) 
Measure of states‟ social 
protection expenditure, 
excluding old age pensions, as 
part of their welfare state 
systems 
Encompasses all interventions 
from public to private bodies 
intended to relieve households 
and individuals of the burden 
of defined risk or need, but 
old age pension benefits 
(Eurostat; Ministry of  
Finance 2013) 
% of GDP 
(4) Labor Market Policies 
Measure of states‟ labor 
intervention policies in 
accordance of their welfare 
state systems 
Encompasses all state 
interventions explicitly 
targeted at groups of people 
with difficulties in labor 
market: unemployed, 
employed but at risk of 
involuntary jobs loss, inactive 
people but in search of 
entering labour market6 
(Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 
2013) 
% of GDP 
(5) Social Protection 
Effectiveness (excl. 
pensions) 
Measure of states‟ social 
protection effectiveness in 
tackling poverty rates 
Calculated comparing at-risk-
of poverty rates before social 
transfers with those after 
transfers –pensions are not 
considered as social transfers 
in these calculations 
(Eurostat) 
Reduction in % of the risk of 
poverty rate, after social 
transfers 
(6) Voice and Accountability 
Measure of the perception on 
political process, civil 
liberties, and political rights 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
Scale of 0  to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
                                                          
5
 See Social Protection metadata at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/spr_esms.htm#unit_measure1488807446916 
6
 See Labour Market Policy metadata at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/fr/lmp_esms.htm 
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correspond to the voice and 
accountability7  (World Bank) 
(7) Political Stability 
Measure of the perception of 
the likelihood that a 
government in power may be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
possible violent means, 
including domestic violence 
and terrorism 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
correspond to the political 
stability8 (World Bank) 





Measure of public service 
quality, the independence of 
the civil service from political 
pressures, and the 
government‟s commitment to 
policies 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
correspond to the  government 
effectiveness9 (World Bank) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
 
(9) Regulatory Quality 
 
Measure of perceptions of the 
ability of the government to 
implement policies and 
regulation that allow and 
promote private sector 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
correspond to the economic 
regulatory quality  (World 
Bank)10 
Scale of 0 to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
(10) Rule of Law 
 
Measure of the extent to 
which people abide by the 
rules of society, and have 
confidence on the judiciary 
system 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
correspond to the rule of law11  
(World Bank) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
(11) Control of Corruption 
Measure of the perception of 
the corruption 
Aggregated measure 
constructed by averaging 
together data from the 
underlying source that 
Scale of 0 to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
                                                          
7
 See Worldwide Governance Indicators‟ representative source for voice and accountability at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
8
 See Worldwide Governance Indicators‟ representative source for political stability: ibid 
9
 See Worldwide Governance Indicators‟ representative source for government effectiveness: ibid 
10
 See Worldwide Governance Indicators‟ representative sources for regulatory quality: ibid  
11 See Worldwide Governance Indicator‟s representative sources  for rule of law: Ibid 
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correspond to the corruption 
perception12 (World Bank) 
(12) Governance Quality 
Measure of the government 
quality 
Calculated mean value of 
indicators ,6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 10 = the 
highest rank 
(13) General Trust 
Measure of trust in other 
people 
A3: Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can‟t be too 
careful13 in dealing with people? 
(ESS 6).Expressed in mean value 
per country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 0= you can‟t 
be too careful, 10 = most 
people can be trusted 
(14) Trust in other’s Help 
Measure of trust in other 
people‟s willingness to help 
out 
A4: Do you think that most 
people would try to take 
advantage14 of you if they got 
the chance, or would they try 
to be fair? (ESS 6) 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 0= most 
people would try to take 
advantage of me, 10= most 
people would try to be fair 
(15) Trust in other’s 
Fairness 
Measure of trust in people‟ 
willingness to be fair to you 
A5: Would you say that most 
of the time people try to be 
helpful15 or that they are 
mostly looking for 
themselves? (ESS 6). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 0= people 
mostly look out for 
themselves, 10= people try to 
be helpful 
(16) Trust 
Summary measure of people‟s 
trust in others 
Calculated mean value of 
indicators 13, 14 and 15 per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 0=no trust , 
10= complete trust 
(17) Trust in Parliament 
Measure of trust towards 
parliament 
B2: Please tell me on a score 
of 0-10 how much you 
personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out; 
Parliament (ESS 6). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0-10, 0= no trust at 
all, 10=complete trust 
                                                          
12 See Worldwide Governance Indicator representative sources: Ibid 
13
 „Can‟t be too careful‟: need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious 
14
 „Take advantage‟: exploit or cheat; „fair‟: in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly  
15
 The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness  
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(18) Trust in Legal System 
Measure of trust towards legal 
system with regard to the its 
fairness and effectiveness 
B3: Please tell me on a score 
of 0-10 how much you 
personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out; The 
legal system (ESS 
6).Expressed in mean value 
per country (Author‟s 
calculation) 
Scale of 0-10, 0= no trust at 
all, 10=complete trust 
(19) Trust in Politicians 
Measure of trust towards 
politicians 
B5: Please tell me on a score 
of 0-10 how much you 
personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out; 
Politicians (ESS 6). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0-10, 0= no trust at 
all, 10=complete trust 
(20) Trust in Political 
Parties 
 
Measure of trust towards 
political parties 
B6: Please tell me on a score 
of 0-10 how much you 
personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out; 
Political Parties (ESS 6). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 0-10, 0= no trust at 
all, 10=complete trust 
(21) Trust in Formal 
Institutions 
Summary measure of citizens‟ 
trust towards formal 
institutions  
Calculated mean value of 
indicators 17, 18, 19, and 20 
per country (Author‟s 
calculation) 
Scale of 0 to 10, 0= no trust at 
all, 10=complete trust 
(22) Legitimacy of Claiming 
Unentitled State Benefits 
Measure of people‟s 
willingness to accept cheating 
on state benefits 
QE20_1: How would you rate 
various actions or behaviors; 
Someone receives welfare 
payment without entitlement 
(Eurobarometer 79.2). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 1 = 
absolutely acceptable, 10= 
absolutely unacceptable 
(23) Legitimacy of Avoiding 
to Pay Public 
Transportation Fare 
Measure of people‟s attitude 
towards free riding practices 
QE20_2: How would you rate 
various actions or behaviors; 
Someone uses public transport 
without a valid ticket 
(Eurobarometer 79.2). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 1 = 
absolutely acceptable, 10= 
absolutely unacceptable 
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(24) Legitimacy of 
Undeclared Income 
Measure of people‟s attitude  
toward informal economic 
practices 
QE20_6: How would you rate 
various actions or behaviors; 
A firm hires an individual and 
all or part of the wages to 
him/her are not officially 
declared (Eurobarometer 
79.2).  
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 1 = 
absolutely acceptable, 10= 
absolutely unacceptable 
(25) Legitimacy of 
Unregistered Salary 
Measure of peoples‟ attitude 
towards informal economic 
practices 
QE20_7: How would you rate 
various actions or behaviors; 
Someone evades taxes by 
declaring or only partially 
declaring their income 
(Eurobarometer 79.2). 
Expressed in mean value per 
country (Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 1 = 
absolutely acceptable, 10= 
absolutely unacceptable 
(26) Civic Norms 
Measure of people‟s attitude 
towards free riding and 
cheating 
Computed measure based on 
the aggregated mean value 
from the variable number 21, 
22, 23 and 24 per country 
(Author‟s calculation) 
Scale of 1 to 10, 1 = 
absolutely acceptable, 10= 
absolutely unacceptable 




Measure of people‟s 
associational networking 
QE_4: Are you member of 
any of the following types of 
non-governmental 




1 if mentioned, 0 If otherwise 
(28) Membership in 
Professional Association 
Measure of peoples‟ 
associational networking 
QE_4: Are you member of 
any of the following types of 
non-governmental 
organizations or associations; 
Professional association such 
as doctors, teachers, farmers 
etc? (Flash Eurobarometer 
373). 
1 if mentioned, 0 If otherwise 
(29) Membership in Trade 
Unions 
Measure of peoples‟ 
associational networking 
QE_4: Are you member of 
any of the following types of 
non-governmental 
organizations or associations; 
Trade Union? (Flash 
Eurobarometer 373). 
1 if mentioned, 0 If otherwise 
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(30) Membership in 
organization with specific 
activity in economic, social, 
environment, cultural or 
sport interest 
Measure of peoples‟ 
associational networking 
QE_4: Are you member of 
any of the following types of 
non-governmental 
organizations or associations; 
Organization with a specific 
economic, social, 
environmental, cultural or 
sporting interest? (Flash 
Eurobarometer 373). 
1 if mentioned, 0 if otherwise 
(31) Associational Activity 
 
Measure of peoples‟ 
engagement in horizontal 
networking through different 
membership in certain 
associations   
Aggregated measure based on 
the average number of groups 
cited in variables 27, 28, 29 




Table 2. Summary of Indicators 
 The values for indicators 2, 3, and 4 as used by Williams, Kedir, and Nadin 
(2013) were not available for Kosovo in the Eurostat database, hence we calculated 
those based on annual governmental spending recorded in the Financial Mirror of the 
Ministry of Finance (2013), as percentage of Kosovo‟s GPD in 2013 (World Bank), 
converting the GDP value obtained from the World Bank data expressed in US$ to EUR 
currency using the appropriate exchange rate. Unfortunately, we could not compute 
indicator 5 for Kosovo, for want of data. Nevertheless, we still found it reasonable to 
include this indicator, in order to make an educated assumption as to where Kosovo 
would likely perform in this indicator, based on theoretical support provided in the 
literature review, the correlational models for this particular indicator as compared to 
the others where Kosovo is present, and the qualitative data obtained in our interviews.   
Indicators 6 to 11 were taken from Torgler and Schneider (2003), which used 
Worldwide Governance Indicators to test for correlation between tax morality and 
institutional quality. However, we manipulated the unit of measurement for 
convenience, by turning the original percentage scale into a 1-10 scale. Moreover, we 
computed a summary „governance quality‟ indicator (12), as the mean value of 
indicators 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
Another set of indicators inspired in the literature review comprises those 
numbered 13, 22 through 25, collected in the European Social Survey; and 27 through 
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30, from Eurobarometer. These operationalize two dimensions of social capital as 
defined by Putnam (1993), and Knack and Keefer (1997). Indicator 13, as used by 
Knack and Keefer, measures people‟s generalized trust in others. To that, we added 
indicators 14 and 15, which grasp two more precise meanings of trust in others‟ fairness 
and selflessness. We also computed a new summary indicator named „trust‟ (16), as the 
mean value of the three preceding ones. Indicators 22 through 25 stand for civic norms 
as a measure of people‟s attitude towards cheating and free-riding (Knack and Keefer 
1997), while 27 through 30 operationalize the concept of horizontal association (Putnam 
1993) or associational activity (Knack and Keefer 1997). We emulated Knack and 
Keefer‟s methodology in computing two distinct variables, namely, civic norms (26) 
and associational activity (31). Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data for 
Kosovo in regard to the later variables. This was, firstly, because Kosovo was not part 
of the Eurobarometer 79.2 and Eurobarometer 373, which were the source of extraction 
for these two variables.  Secondly, no alternative studies were available either from 
domestic and international actors that provided us with any raw statistical data on the 
two respective variables. Despite that, we decided to include this indicator in our study 
for the same reasons and purpose as in indicator 5.  
Lastly, indicators 17 through 20, found in the European Social Survey, provide 
operational approaches to institutional asymmetry as defined in Gerxhani (1999) and 
Williams and Franic (2016). We added summary indicator 21 „trust in formal 
institutions‟, as the mean value of the former indicators.  
The hypotheses were tested using the bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient 




CHAPTER III: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
1. Welfare state  
In order to test our first core hypothesis, we used three indicators for welfare 
state policies‟ expenditure, namely expenditure on social protection benefits, with and 
without old age benefits, and on labour market policies, testing for bivariate Pearson 
correlation coefficient with informal economy. We found a strong significant negative 
correlation between all the welfare expenditure indicators and the size of informal 
economy. This finding supports our core hypothesis (1), which presumes that inefficient 
welfare state programs and high economic informality reciprocally contribute to each 
other. Results yielded from our test are in line with Williams and Renooy (2013) 
original findings.  
As figure 8 shows, the lower the countries‟ levels of expenditures on social 
protection benefits, the larger is the informal economy (rp= -.755**). Moreover, we 
found that 58% of the variance of the size of informal economy is correlated with the 
variance of the social protection benefits (adjusted   = 0.586). As such, we found that 
countries which allocated higher proportion of GDP on social protection benefits 
register smaller informal economy. In addition, figure 9 displays that social protection 
benefits (excluding old age benefits) and informal economy register an even higher 
significant negative correlation (rp= -.829**), and social protection benefits (excluding 
old age benefits) accounts for as high as 67% of the size for the informal economy 
(adjusted   = .675).  
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Figure 8. The negative correlation between informal economy and social protection 
benefits (Schneider 2015; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 2013, computed by the author; 
Riinvest 2013) 
 
Figure 9. The negative correlation between informal economy and social protection 
benefits, excluding old age benefits (Schneider 2015; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 
2013, computed by the author; Riinvest 2013) 
Figure 10 displays a lower, but still significant correlation between the size of 
informal economies and the amount of states‟ expenditures on labor market 
interventions (rp= -.628), accounting for 37% of the variance in the former (adjusted 
  = .371). These results show that countries that interfere more in their labor markets 
through protection policies tend to have significantly lower levels of informal economy.  
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Figure 10. The negative correlation between informal economy and labour market 
policy expenditures (Schneider 2015; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 2013, computed by 
the author; Riinvest 2013) 
 Our findings seem consistent with a structuralist approach. As argued above in 
the literature review, the latter advocates for more market regulation, state intervention 
and higher social protection spending in order to minimize informal economic practices. 
However, we express caution with regards to the result, given that although they do 
suggest that such a relationship exists, our current results are not equipped to provide 
evidence for the causal direction, and indeed our hypotheses on this matter are stated in 
terms of reciprocal relationships between the two, rather than liner causation.  
 More specifically concerning our sub hypothesis 1(a), we used the social 
protection effectiveness indicator, excluding expenditure on old age pensions. The 
results, as displayed in figure 11, show a significant negative correlation with the size of 
informal economies (rp= -.697), accounting for 47% of total variance (  = .467). 
Countries that register lower reduction in risk poverty rate after social transfers are 
distributed, tend to have significantly higher levels of informal economy. This finding 
supports our sub-hypothesis 1(a), which states that poorly managed welfare programs 
contribute to the size of informal economy, and sub-hypothesis 1(c) which acts as 
circular in respect to sub-hypothesis 1(a) by stating that informal economy contribute to 
the size and the effectiveness of welfare state programs.  
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Figure 11. The negative correlation between informal economy and the effectiveness of 
state protection expenditure (Schneider 2015; Eurostat) 
 A statistically significant correlation was also found between welfare benefits 
expenditures and effectiveness, and citizens‟ perception of governance quality and trust 
in public institutions. In order to assess our assumption in hypothesis 1(b) that poorly 
funded and managed welfare programs contribute to lower citizens‟ trust in public 
institutions and perception of governance quality, we used social protection benefits, 
with and without old age benefits, state protection effectiveness and labour market 
policy as indicators of welfare programs‟ funding and management, and tested for 
correlation with trust in formal institutions and governance quality indicators.  
 Figures 12 and 13 display positive correlations between social protection 
benefits and governance quality, as well as trust in public institutions respectively. 
Countries that spend more on social protection benefits significantly tend to have higher 
governance quality (rp= .712), and trust in formal institutions (rp= .537).  
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Figure 12. The positive relation between social protection benefits and governance 
quality (World Bank, computed by the author; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 2013, 
computed by the author) 
 
Figure 13. The positive relation between social protection benefits and trust in formal 
institutions (European Social Survey 6, computed by the author; Eurostat; Ministry of 
Finance 2013, computed by the author) 
A similar outcome was yielded by correlation tests between social protection 
benefits, excluding old age benefits, on the one hand, and governance quality and trust 
in public institutions, on the other. As displayed in figure 14 and 15, both tested for 
significant positive correlations (rp= .804, and rp= .635, respectively).  
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Figure 14.  The positive relation between social protection benefits (excluding old age 
benefits) and governance quality (World Bank, computed by the author; Eurostat; 
Ministry of Finance 2013, computed by the author) 
 
Figure 15. The positive relation between social protection benefits (excluding old age 
benefits) and trust in formal institutions (European Social Survey 6, computed by the 
author; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 2013, computed by the author) 
 Figure 16 below displays the significant positive correlation found between 
another welfare program indicator, namely labour market policy and citizens‟ 
perception on governance quality (rp= .566). However, contrary to our expectations, we 
found no statistical significance between expenditure in labor market policies and trust 
in formal institutions.  
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Figure 16. The positive relation between labour market policy and governance quality 
(World Bank, computed by the author; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance 2013, computed 
by the author) 
 
Figure 17. The positive relation between state protection effectiveness and governance 
quality (World Bank, computed by the author; Eurostat) 
 Lastly, figures 17 and 18 display positive correlations between successfully 
managed welfare programs, higher governance quality (rp= .780) and trust in formal 
institutions (rp= .684). 
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Figure 18. The positive relation between state protection effectiveness and trust in 
formal institutions (European Social Survey, computed by the author; Eurostat) 
Therefore, with the exception of the presumed relationship between expenditure 
in labour market policies and trust in formal institutions, the significant correlations 
found in the rest of the cases endorse our hypotheses that countries that experience 
higher welfare state programs funding and effectiveness, also rate significantly higher 
governance quality, citizens‟ trust in formal institutions, and lower sizes of informal 
economy.  
2. Social capital 
Our second core hypothesis was tested by using three indicators, those of social 
trust, associational activity and civic norms, in relation to informal economy. Given our 
theoretical assumption that social capital contributes to lower levels of informal 
economy, the purpose of the test was to assess whether those indicators partake in a 
statistically significant correlation with the size of informal economy. We found out that 
two out of three indicators, namely social trust and associational activity, are 
significantly correlated with informal economy, unlike that of civic norms.  
Figure 19 displays that countries that register higher social trust tend to have 
significantly smaller informal economies (rp= .638), accounting for 38% of the variance 
in the size of informal economy (adjusted   = 0.380). This outcome statically supports 
our sub-hypothesis 2(a).  
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Figure 19. The negative relation between informal economy and social trust (Schneider 
2015; European Social Survey 6, computed by the author; Riinvest 2013)  
 Figure 20 also illustrates the statistically significant negative correlation found 
between informal economy and associational activity (rp= -.659), accounting for 46% of 
the variance (adjusted   = .460). Countries that engage in more associational activity, 
or horizontal networking in Putnam‟s terms, tend to have smaller informal economies. 
This empirical outcome supports our sub-hypothesis 2 (c). 
 
Figure 20. The negative relation between informal economy and associational activity 
(Schneider 2015; Eurobarometer 373, computed by the author) 
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 Contrary to our hypothesis 2(b), however, that shared civic norms against 
informal economic practices and free-riding practices contribute to lower the levels of 
informal economy, we have found no statistical significant correlation between civic 
norms and informal economy.  
3. Institutional asymmetry  
 Our third core hypothesis assumed that greater asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions contributes to greater propensity to engage in the informal 
economic sector, and it was tested using trust in formal institutions and perception of 
governance quality as the two respective representative indicators for the two sub-
hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b).  
 Figure 21 displays a significant negative correlation between the size of informal 
economies and trust in formal institutions (rp= -.667), which accounts for 42% of the 
variance (adjusted   = .419), which lends support to our sub-hypothesis 3(a).  
 
Figure 21. The negative relation between informal economy and trust in formal 
institutions (Schneider 2015; European Social Survey 6, computed by the author; 
Riinvest 2013) 
 Lastly, figure 22 displays a statistically strong negative correlation between the 
size of informal economies and governance quality (rp = -.845), the highest correlation 
among the entire set of indicators, accounting for 70% of variance (  = .703), also 
signifying the higher variance score. Accordingly, countries that have higher perception 
on governance quality have smaller informal economy. The outcome of this correlation 
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confirms our hypothesis 3(b) that perceived governance quality contributes to lower 
levels of informal economy.  
 
Figure 22. The negative relation between informal economy and governance quality 
(Schneider 2015; World Bank, computed by the author; Riinvest 2013) 
Taken together, both correlations support that institutional asymmetry affects the 
size of informal economies. This is important to our argument in that hypothesis 3 
represents the closing end of the sub-hypothesis 1(b), in terms of the significance that 
the formal institutions carry in their relation to the size of informal economy and 
welfare state. We thus find that countries that enjoy higher governance quality and trust 
in formal institutions, and also exhibit higher welfare state expenditure shown by the 
relationship confirmed above concerning sub-hypothesis 1(b), tend to experience lower 
levels of informality. Even though we cannot provide proof of a linear cause-effect 
relationship, an empirical relationship between welfare programs, formal institutions 
and informal economy is evident. 
4. The case of Kosovo 
We shall now zoom in on the position that Kosovo occupies in relation to other 
countries, with regard to our core hypotheses. Figure 1 displays Kosovo standing alone 
as the country with the highest informal economy rate of 37%, and the lowest social 
protection benefits, of only 4.1% of GDP (Ministry of Finances 2013). The closest 
group in terms of social protection benefits expenditure and size of informal economy 
are other former socialist countries of Romania, the Baltics, and Bulgaria. At the other 
end of the linear distribution we find a constellation of North West European countries, 
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the cases with highest social protection expenditures and lowest informal economy. In- 
between, generally we find South European countries and some Central East European 
countries with socialist past such as Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Croatia, and Poland which to a considerable extent lean towards post socialist countries 
in the higher end of figure. If a categorization of countries with regard to the relation 
between informal economy and social protection benefits were to be made, we would 
have three particular categories; North-West European countries at the lower end of 
informal economy sizes, South European and Central East European post-socialist 
countries which experienced a rather successful political and economic transition to 
market-based economy at the middle, and East and South East post-socialist European 
countries, including Kosovo, at the higher end. 
An almost identical pattern can be found in the figure 2, as indeed throughout 
the remaining figures. Strikingly, Kosovo‟s social protection benefits, once old age 
benefits are excluded, drop to only 1.5% of GDP (Ministry of Finances 2013), a 
decrease by around 65%, unlike in any other European countries (Eurostat 2013). This 
uncovers an important characteristic of Kosovo‟s welfare system, which definitely 
revolves around pensions expenditures.  
As we have described, Kosovo employs a neo-liberal welfare system, founded 
on three main schemes. Such kind of systems is heavily reliant on healthy market-based 
economy, effective state mechanisms capable of taxing economic activities, and 
citizens‟ individual contributions to pension funds. The literature review has shown us 
that Kosovo is, at best, still in a developing stage of a mature market economy. In spite 
of progress having been made, formal institutions remain fragile and prone to 
mismanagement, incompetency and corruption allegations. According to our 
interviewee Mrs. Arberesha Loxha, from the Group for Legal and Political Studies, it 
was only recently that the government has shown any interest in addressing the issue of 
informality. Measures to tackle this problem have been introduced, in the form of a new 
fiscal package which lowered the rate of Value Added Tax (VAT) for basic products, a 
nationwide campaign of fiscal coupons reimbursement as an incentive to insert the 
practice of businesses to release fiscal coupons for each purchase, increased supervision 
of the building sector and of petrol businesses (interview with Loxha 2017).  With the 
exception of the reimbursement campaign, which has been received very well in public 
(interviews with Krasniqi; Loxha), the rest of the measures are yet to mark any 
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considerable success. Changes in VAT rate were met with strong criticism and assessed 
as counterproductive (interview with Loxha). Concerns remain about the successful 
fiscal control of petrol businesses (interview with A. Demi), and the building sector 
remains the largest sector operating informally (interviews with Azemi; A. Demi; 
Krasniqi; Merovci).  
It is vital to emphasize that Kosovo continues to be politically challenged within 
its own territory. Although publicly declared otherwise, Kosovo continues not to have 
absolute control over around 13% of its territory in the north, which is mainly populated 
by Kosovo Serbs. For Agron Demi from GAP Institute, this represents one source of 
economic instability in Kosovo. He goes on to say that the petrol derivatives as well as 
other products are often smuggled in Kosovo from Serbia through alternative routes, 
and cases of that happening are fairly evident. Lack of control over that region harms 
economic competition in the rest of the territory. Notably, labor and tax inspection is 
rather absent in that part of the territory, as none of the representatives of the relevant 
institutions during our field research felt confident to confirm the presence of the state‟s 
institutional authority over there. 
The private sector has struggles of its own. Corruption, lack of rule of law, 
administrative barriers to some extent, and unfair businesses environment are often 
listed as the major fallbacks that the market economy faces in Kosovo (Interviews with 
Hashani; Loxha 2017). As such, labor laws are blatantly violated in the private sector, 
and very little has been done in that regard. From our field research, it is evident that 
human resources lack both in the labor inspection department as well as tax 
administration (Interviews with Krasniqi; Leci). There are 52 labor inspectors in 
Kosovo, assigned to supervise over 110,000 registered businesses, and the responsibility 
this puts upon these inspectors is all but unbearable. Basing his stand on analysis 
conducted by GAP, Mr. Agron Demi notes that while according to labor laws, each 
business should be inspected at least once a year, based on the human capacities 
available to the respective institution this means that “one inspector should work in 
average every day of the week, including weekends, and visit at least 50 businesses a 
day”, pointing out at the problem with implementing the legislative framework, where 
“laws have been passed but the requisites and enough budgetary support have not been 
met” (interview with A. Demi). Recommendations to increase the number of inspectors 
and human resources have been reported, from both domestic and international actors 
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(interviews with Azemi; A. Demi; Hashani; Krasniqi; Leci), however, they have never 
been addressed.  
Thereupon, practices such as informal employment in the private sector go as 
high as 50%, according to Mr. Jusuf Azemi, president of Trade Unions in Kosovo. 
Azemi goes on to denounce the unfavorable conditions under which employees in the 
private sector operate; 80% of them experience delays in their monthly salaries, 
constantly work with short term contract of 3 to 6 months, and pensions contributions 
are often not paid. These circumstances endanger the welfare of the employees, who 
enjoy the returns of their work only in short term, and retirement plans are deemed a 
luxury (interview with Azemi).  In addition to job insecurity, hazardous workplace 
conditions are also a serious concern, especially for those operating in the building 
sector. Therefore, Azemi fears that a cultural acceptance of these terms and conditions 
has been established, and working without a contract and favorable working conditions 
is no longer a serious issue for the active labor force. Moreover, the high level of 
unemployment reassures the socio-economic pressure on employees to adjust to the 
current labor environment without resistance.     
Taking all the above into consideration, unsurprisingly Kosovo continues to 
have the lowest contribution rates in the region. Expressed in numbers, in 2013, only 
62% of the registered contributors had actively contributed to the contributory pension 
fund, 14% of the newly registered contributors were 40 year old or above, which was 
the average age of an active contributor, and the average balance of an active 
contributor prior to retirement was around EUR 4000.00 (TRUST 2013), which should 
last no longer that two and a half years based on a monthly pension in of EUR 150.00. 
No positive significant changes were marked in the next years. Quite the 
opposite in fact. In 2014, 2015, and 2016 the percentage of registered contributors who 
had actively contributed decreased to 60%, 58% and 57% respectively (TRUST 2014; 
2015; 2016). Moreover, in the annual reports of TRUST itself, concerns about the low 
number of active contributors is often addressed as an indicator of the high levels of 
informal economy evident in Kosovo. This goes on to show that current pension 
schemes are unsustainable (interview with A. Demi). Retirement age in Kosovo is 65, 
while the life expectancy is 74 (World Bank), meaning that for the most part of 
retirement an average retiree will not be covered by his pension savings and hence will 
become an immediate burden to the government budget, due to the basic pension 
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entitlement for every senior citizen. Azemi was confident that no more than 30% of the 
employees in the private sector will inherent a full pension upon retirement (inerview 
with Azemi). Based on the current trends, the number of citizens who will rely on the 
only the basic pension, due to their early exit from the contributory scheme, will 
increase greatly during the next 15 to 20 years (Interview with A. Demi). Nevertheless, 
Jeton Demi from TRUSTi insisted that the current pension model is the best solution 
possible, regardless of certain glitches, and believed that the model is sustainable. He 
stated that 
Kosovo has experienced the optimal moment to mark its transition of pension 
system. We are witness that solidarity social schemes are becoming a heavy 
burden for the budget of many countries, particularly of those countries that are 
experiencing a disharmony in the population‟s age, and although Kosovo is not 
exposed to this problem in the medium term, recent statistics show that the 
number of retirees is increasing in higher rates than before (interview with J 
Demi). 
Jeton Demi also told that to his knowledge, no study on the demographic trends 
in Kosovo had preceded the decision in 2001 to employ the current model. According to 
him, the current pensions system was built upon the premise that it would unload the 
burden on the central budget that would otherwise have been caused by the extremely 
high unemployment rate following the war. In addition, considering the numbers of 
young population registered in Kosovo, “it was seen as a good opportunity that citizens, 
in the long term, will have time to contribute sufficiently to their personal pension funds 
to provide them a comfortable life upon retirement”. Nevertheless, Mr. Jeton Demi 
admits that challenges and obstacles have been experienced in fulfilling its potential, 
naming the lack of economic development, poor rule of law, and informal economy as 
the main challenges.  
According to figure 3 above, the lowest levels of labour market intervention 
expenditures are found in our case study, together with Romania, with only 0.3% of the 
GPD dedicated to policies that explicitly target groups of people with difficulties in the 
labor market such as the unemployed, people at risk of involuntary job loss, and 
inactive people but who are in search of entering the labor market (Eurostat). Similarly 
to the previous figures, Kosovo is situated in the category of the East and South East 
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post-socialist European countries that mark the highest rates of informal economy and 
lowest expenditures on labor market interventions. 
Kosovo has very limited programs of labor market intervention, with 
correspondingly limited budgets. It has a Centre for Professional Training providing 
professional training, an Employment Office proving services and assistance for those 
who are unemployed and in search of entering the labor market, and provides early 
pensions for two particular groups; former Kosovo Protecting Troops members and 
former employees of Trepca (Budget Law 2013). Understandably, Kosovo is unable to 
finance further such programs, given its economic instability and the situation discussed 
above. Moreover, Mr. A. Demi asserts that Kosovo has no economic foundation to 
finance the current social programs, let alone extend them – targeting his critique at the 
recent law that ensures pensions for war veterans and invalids. According to this law, all 
former members and contributors to the Kosovo Liberation Army who participated in 
the war and who are currently unemployed are entitled to pensions provided by the 
government. The number of beneficiaries who will benefit from these pensions amount 
to as high as 50,000 people (Interview with A Demi). This law, in its current form, has 
been met by strong criticism by both domestic and international actors, including the 
International Monetary Fund, labeled as highly unfeasible and seriously risky to 
budgetary sustainability (Interviews with A. Demi; Loxha). It has also been subject to 
manipulations and abuse by individuals who, in their attempt to become eligible for the 
pension, have resigned from their workplaces in the formal sector and have urged their 
employer to unregister them from the official payroll, while making themselves 
available to keep on working for informal wages, or have searched for new jobs in the 
informal sector (interviews with Azemi; A. Demi; Merovci). Such experiences may stir 
up the assumption that under the current institutional capabilities for control, the 
introduction of other social programs, as for instance unemployment benefits, may be 
prone to similar backfiring effects. 
 Allegations of abuse and mismanagement are also made about other social 
programs as well (interview with A. Demi), which question the effectiveness of state 
protection programs. Admittedly, we have no data for the effectiveness of the welfare 
programs in tackling poverty in of Kosovo for the referring year. However, we have two 
main reference points enabling us to project where Kosovo might have stood in the 
relation discussed concerning sub-hypothesis 1(a). Firstly, a study by Murati and 
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Berisha (2010) argued that if the current available social transfers were to be terminated, 
the poverty rate would have increased by 12%. Although their study included data from 
2009, since then to 2013 no significant increase in benefits value and expenditures has 
been recorded (IKS 2016b; Ministry of Welfare and Labour 2017). This gives us a 
rather strong sense of the impact that state protection expenditure could have had in 
2013. Secondly, our empirical result showed a negative correlation between informal 
economy and state protection effectiveness. Based on this, Kosovo might arguably be 
positioned as the country with the higher informal rates and the lowest impact of state 
protection expenditures, followed by Romania and Bulgaria. If we go back to Figure 4, 
Kosovo may fit right in the category of East and South East post-socialist European 
countries, together with those of Greece and Italy hard-hit by the financial crisis, under 
the overall negative correlation between the size of informal economies and state 
protection effectiveness. 
 The state of welfare state programs and their effectiveness is also related to the 
governance quality and trust in formal institutions, as suggested by the negative 
correlations displayed above in figures 12 to 18. Kosovo registers the lowest rates of 
governance quality, and has one of the lowest rates of trust in formal institutions, 
together with Bulgaria, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Slovenia. Arguably, lack of 
governance quality may be billed to the fact that Kosovo is still a young state in the 
making, and challenges which it faces today are common features of young states 
coming out of war and transition. And as a result, the fragility and incompetency of 
government institutions do not contribute positively to the levels of public trust in them 
either. Low trust in state institutions is also support by several domestic studies; 
confirming that trust remains low and no significant positive trend is recorded (KCSS 
2014; 2015; 2016). In that regards, Mr. Agron Demi makes an interesting remark that 
the lack of trust towards state institutions was the product of social-political 
circumstances evident in the 90s, when Kosovo‟s autonomous status was revoked. He 
believes that such negative attitude is a result of suppressive and violent experiences 
caused by then state control institutions. For instance, many public institutions and 
enterprises were subject of usurpation, destruction and looting after the liberation in 
2000 (interview with A. Demi). To which one might add the suppression of the right to 
collect pensions from earlier contributors to the former Yugoslav pension scheme. The 
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ensuing poor performance of formal institutions has to this day limited public trust in 
them. 
 Low trust towards formal institutions and lack of governance quality is also 
correlated to informal economy, as confirmed by our results (figures 21 and 22). The 
case of Kosovo fits into this correlation as well. It shows support to the theoretical 
suggestion of institutional asymmetry, which highlights the significance of lack of trust 
and a negative perception of formal institutions in breeding informality. Such 
asymmetry is strikingly evident in Kosovo, providing a context to understand her large 
informal economy. Lack of trust and negative perception towards formal institutions 
undermine their ability to develop a healthy cooperation with citizens in paying taxes, 
and respecting their civic responsibilities. 
Under such circumstances, common good becomes a farfetched ideal, and 
abuses of public services and social programs are not seen as irresponsible behaviors 
but rather as ways for people to get back at those institutions who they particularly feel 
that have failed them.  Citizens‟ decision to evade may be dictated by such relation; the 
lower the trust that government and the public institutions will provide the services 
promised in return, the lower the predisposition for one to adhere to his or her civic 
responsibility (Wintrobe and Gërxhani n/d). Studies in Kosovo show that Kosovars 
have rather a firm perception that state has the sole responsibility to provide work for 
everyone who seeks for one (72% strongly agree), provide an acceptable standard of 
living for elderly (86% strongly agree) and for the unemployed (78% strongly agree), 
while simultaneously a majority of people believe that Kosovo has enough funds to help 
these categories of people (IKS 2016c). 
This shows how high the expectations Kosovars seem to have with regards to the 
role of the state in providing a better welfare, and the failure to do so should inevitably 
impacts their lack of trust and negative perception towards the state. Formal institutions‟ 
ability to provide good social welfare services is determined by the cooperation with 
their own citizens; the effectiveness of such services, however, is determined by the 
quality of institutions, and by the prerequisites inhibiting potential abusers who could 
benefit from state funded welfare programs while at the same time being active in the 
informal economy (Interview with A. Demi) – which are clearly not in place.  
 Similar relationships hold between the size of countries‟ informal economies and 
the degrees of social trust and associational activity. Kosovo records one of the lowest 
 82
social trust rates in Europe (Figure 19). Given that our results have confirmed the 
negative correlation between informal economy and social trust, it is fair to suggest that 
the decision of the individuals to participate in the informal economy is related to the 
perception of prevalence of such behavior among other (Wintrobe and Gërxhani n/d). 
When citizens assume that others are not paying taxes, they tend to evade taxes as well 
– suggesting that there may be a tipping point at which the perceived number of tax 
evaders and informal economic practitioners reaches such a level, that practices of 
informal economy become socially epidemic (Wintrobe and Gërxhani n/d). While 
operating in such a way is considered against the law, and avoiding such civic 
responsibilities will damage the integrity and the quality of public and social services, 
the lack of social trust and the related assumption that not many are contributing to such 
common goods may diminish the public‟s willingness to do so. Anna Danielsson, in her 
field notes on the ubiquity of informal culture in Kosovo, went as stated that  
“informality  nurtures  informality”  (Danielsson  2015,  119), and “informality appears 
to form a hierarchical and unequal social activity … at the same time informal economic 
practices have become commonsensical in the minds of people. Informality is taken for 
granted and undisputed” (Danielsson 2015, 120).  
Even though we do not have empirical data on Kosovo‟s associational activity, 
or horizontal networking in Putnam‟s term, we may nevertheless make an educated 
assumption as to where Kosovo stands in this regard. First, Danielsson‟s contribution 
(2016) calls to attention the relevance of power and social configuration in Kosovo. She 
uncovers the existence and significance of what Putnam (1993) has called “vertical 
networking”, which are relations based on asymmetrical obligation and exchanges of 
the patron-client type, and which are harmful to social capital (in Putnam‟s sense), as 
they do not provide the right conditions to breed cooperation and trust but rather are 
exposed to opportunism. Danielsson (2015) points out that many businesses claim that 
they face obstacles and an unfair environment that go beyond institutional constraints. 
Businesses with a privileged position act in a way that produces unfair competition, 
which pushes other less privileged businesses to operate informally. Similar cases are 
found in post-socialist states where people connected to government continue to enjoy 
rewards from such vertical networking (Fligstein 1996). Due to this unfair environment 
and power relations, legal regulations place certain businesses better than others by 
allowing them, for instance, to “win contracts in openly announced procurement 
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processes, win public bids despite their operating license having been withdrawn, gain 
licit and illicit profits from processes of privatization, and benefit from the protection 
and involvement of criminal groups” (Denielsson 2016, 12). Allegations about the 
existence of such vertical networking that involve high-ranking officials and politicians, 
supported by the evidenced high level of corruption in Kosovo, suggests that Kosovo 
may have considerably low amplitude of horizontal networking. This is further backed 
by the fact that the available statistical data show associational activity to be strongly 
and positively correlated with social trust (rp= .790), as displayed in figure 23.  This 
suggests that in countries where social trust is low, so is associational activity. Based on 
what we already know, Kosovo has one of the lowest social trust rates in Europe, 
suggesting that Kosovo is also very likely to have low levels of associational activity, or 
horizontal networking, which in turn are negatively related to informal economy.  
 
Figure 23. The positive relation between associational activity and social trust 





1. Main findings  
The findings of our study are divided in three main sections. Primarily, we 
sought to address the correlation between the size of the informal economy and welfare 
state programs, with a particular interest in the case of Kosovo. Our bivariate correlation 
results displayed that a strong negative relationship is found between indicators of 
welfare state, namely social protection benefits and labour market policy, and the levels 
of informal economy among 29 countries, including Kosovo. The outcomes are in line 
with Williams and Renooy (2013) study. We found that the size of the informal 
economy is also negatively correlated with the impact or effectiveness of these 
programs, and that the size and effectiveness of welfare programs are negatively 
correlated with citizens‟ trust in public institutions and their perception of government 
quality. That is to say the higher the informal economy, the lower the welfare state 
programs expenditures, but also the weaker the impact of these programs in tackling 
poverty and increasing welfare, which in return, we argue, lowers the trust towards 
formal institutions and discourages compliance behavior amongst citizens, thereby 
sustaining the reciprocal relationship stated in our core hypothesis 1. 
Our empirical findings show support to our core hypothesis 1 that inefficient 
welfare state programs and a high level of informal economy reciprocally contribute to, 
and reinforce each other. Nevertheless, we express our caution with regards to the 
entirety of our results, because although they do suggest that such a relationship exists, 
we are not equipped to provide evidence disentangling causal directions or their relative 
intensities. Our case study fits rightly into our analytical model. Kosovo stands alone as 
the country with the highest informal economy rate and the lowest social protection 
benefits, closest to former socialist countries of Romania, the Baltics, and Bulgaria. 
Strikingly, Kosovo‟s social protection drops much more sharply when excluding old 
age benefits than any other European country, which reveals how much Kosovo‟s 
welfare system revolves around pension expenditures. 
Kosovo‟s neo-liberal type of welfare state system heavily relies on healthy 
market based economy, the state‟s capacity to tax economic activities, and citizens‟ 
individual contributions to pension funds, areas in which Kosovo falls significantly 
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short. Consequently, Kosovo‟s current welfare state programs are weak, unsustainable, 
and ineffective, and therefore fail to provide incentives for compliance behavior and 
attract citizens to exit the informal sector. 
Secondly, we found that social capital is also to a large extent negatively 
correlated to the levels of informal economy. With the exception of civic norms, for 
which we found no statistical significance, social trust and associational activity 
displayed strong negative relationship with informal economy. The results support that 
less generalized trust among citizens favors informal economy and that citizen‟s 
engagement in associational activities or horizontal networking is also related to the 
levels of informal economy. 
These findings represent original contributions to the theoretical relevance of 
social capital in relation to informal economy. Both social trust and associational 
activity contribute to the incentives for cooperation and increase the awareness of civic 
responsibility and common public good, which arguably hinder the adhesion to informal 
economy. In that respect, Kosovo has one of the lowest levels of social trust, and 
expectedly the highest level of informal economy; and while no data on associational 
activity were obtained regarding Kosovo, we were able to make educated assumptions 
based on literature review and indirect inferences from our data.  
And thirdly, our findings supported an institutional asymmetry approach. We 
found strong negative correlations between the size of informal economies, trust in 
formal institutions, and governance quality. Our findings strongly suggest that countries 
that enjoy higher governance quality and trust in formal institutions experience low 
informality, and also exhibit higher welfare state expenditure. This illustrates how 
important is trust in formal institutions and a positive perception on governance quality. 
It has already been mentioned several times that welfare programs‟ size and 
effectiveness is dependent on the formal institutions‟ quality and ability to collect taxes, 
but we believe that is also dependent on their approach to provide strong incentives for 
citizens to comply with their civic responsibilities. To our evaluation, better welfare 
state provisions, alongside other policy measures that monitor them, could be one step 
in that direction. A lack thereof discourages compliance behavior of citizens and pushes 
them to shirk paying taxes, as response to the governments‟ failure to provide adequate 
support in cases of social risks, leaving them vulnerable to the market and the family 
only (Aidukatite 2009; 2010). 
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In each of the two relationships, Kosovo stands out as the country with the 
lowest perception of governance quality and among those with the lowest trust in the 
formal institutions. Therefore, formal institutions do not provide enough incentives to 
compliant and cooperative behaviors between citizens and the state. Under such 
circumstances, we argue that citizens fail to relate to the state and see themselves as 
being on their own. On top of that, interestingly, Kosovars have rather a firm perception 
that the state has the sole responsibility to provide work for everyone who seeks 
employment and provide acceptable standards of living for the needing, and they 
believe that the state has enough funds for that (IKS 2016c). Failing to do so further 
undermines their trust in formal institutions and nourishes their decision to willingly 
operate in the informal sector, weakens the impact of these programs due to abuse and 
mismanagement, and in return breeds more informality.  
2. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Our study faced a number of imitations related to the availability and quality of 
data.  First and foremost, the value of our main indicator, informal economy, is subject 
of two separate measuring procedures found in two separate scientific works. We base 
the value of informal economy for our case study in the work of Riinvest Institute study 
in 2013, which is the only available study that measures the level of informal economy 
in Kosovo. Its estimation of informal economic practices was based on surveys with 
managers of private companies in Kosovo, while the calculation of the value of informal 
economy for the rest of the countries in this study was achieved through multiple 
indicators and multiple courses estimation procedure (MIMIC) found in the work of 
Schneider (2015). We are aware that the availability of data on informal economy 
originating from a singular source for all the countries included in our study could have 
increased the accuracy of our results.  
Secondly, lack of data for particular indicators in the case of Kosovo was 
another limitation. As a result, we were forced to make educated assumptions on 
associational activity and the effectiveness of state protection expenditures indicators. 
Availability and accessibility to official data would have helped us to complete our set 
of database and enable us to provide accurate and confident results regarding our case 
study.  
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Thirdly, the lack of longitudinal data, particularly for our case study, disabled us 
to provide more information on the eventual rise or decline in the levels of informal 
economy, and its relation with welfare state programs, social capital, and institutional 
quality throughout transition and recent periods. Longitudinal data would have helped 
us to develop more robust predictive models capable of exploiting the relationships 
discussed in our study. 
In the face of our limitations, we would encourage further studies to bridge the 
gap on statistical data with regard to our research question. Further research is needed to 
replicate and/or adapt survey models of the kind of the European Social Survey and 
Eurobarometer to measure attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns in population in the 
case of our study. Kosovo is often excluded from cross-national studies. It has never 
been part of the Eurobarometer, and will continue not to partake for as long it is not a 
member of the European Union, while it has only participated in the round 6 of 
European Social Survey. We understand that Kosovo is a young state and it has 
emerged in the international scene only recently, but precisely for that reason the lack of 
data with regards to our subjects of matter is all the more a problematic issue that must 
be addressed. Empirical investigation of time series data that could be made available is 
the future is crucial.  
Our study has shown that, in a cross-national database, informal economy is 
negatively correlated with welfare state programs, institutional quality, trust in formal 
institutions, social trust and associational activity. Further studies are required to 
explore this correlation within the case of our study. We suggest one such study would 
include a single national sample survey in which questions with regard to measuring 
informal economic practices, perception of welfare state programs, institutional quality, 
trust in formal institutions, social trust and participation in associational activity are 
included, which would serve as a single database able to test for correlations. 
Finally, further research should go beyond single bivariate correlations and use 
multivariate statistics to look at the extent to which informal economy, welfare state 
programs, social capital and institutional capital affect interact with one another, assess 
causal directions, and more importantly their relative weights in influencing the levels 
of informal economy. Which, again, will require wider datasets and, admittedly in the 
case of this research, furthering our analytical skills. 
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Table 3. Correlation values of welfare state indicators and informal economy 
 
 
Table 4. Social protection benefits and informal economy accounting variance 
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Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 29 29 29 28 28
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
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a .600 .586 5.1036 .600 40.576 1 27 .000
Model Summary
b
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
a. Predictors: (Constant), Social protection benefits as % of GDP 
b. Dependent Variable: Informal economy as % of GDP
R Square 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
1 .829
a .687 .675 4.5184 .687 59.214 1 27 .000
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
a. Predictors: (Constant), Social protection benefits (exlc. old age benefit) as % of GDP 
R Square 




a .395 .371 6.2370 .395 16.950 1 26 .000
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Labour market policy expenditure as % of GDP
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Table 8. Correlation values between social protection benefits, and governance quality 
and trust in formal institutions 
 
 
Table 9. Correlation values between social protection benefits (excluding old age 
benefits), and governance quality and trust in formal institutions 
 
R Square 




a .486 .467 5.3047 .486 24.611 1 26 .000
Change Statistics
a. Predictors: (Constant), The effectiveness of state protection expenditure % 
Model Summary
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Table 10. Correlation values between labour market expenditures, and governance 
quality and trust in formal institutions 
 
 
Table 11. Correlation values between the effectiveness of state protection expenditures, 
and governance quality and trust in formal institutions 
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 13. Social trust and informal economy accounting variance 
 
 
Table 14. Correlation values between informal economy and associational activity 
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Model Summary
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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a. Predictors: (Constant),  Associational Activity
Model Summary









Table 16. Correlation values between informal economy and civic norm 
 
 
Table 17. Correlation values between informal economy and governance quality 
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Sig. (2-
tailed)
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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% of GDP
R Square 




a .713 .703 4.3230 .713 67.183 1 27 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Governance Quality 
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
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Table 19. Correlation values between informal economy and trust in formal institutions 
 
 
Table 20. Trust in formal institutions and informal economy accounting variance 
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Model Summary
























**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
